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1. The concept of toleration 
Toleration reconsidered 
“Those who distinguish between civil and theological intolerance are 
mistaken, in my opinion. The two tolerances are inseparable. It is impossible 
to live in peace with people one believes to be damned; to love them would be 
to hate the God who punishes them; one must absolutely bring them back [to 
the fold] or torment them.”1 
Toleration, according to Jean Hampton, is the “substantive heart of 
liberalism”, and many other authors within the liberal tradition of political thought 
acknowledge its central importance.2 While we may now consider toleration to be 
a duty of just citizens and a necessary feature of a just state, it was in fact an 
infrequent achievement in the past, and very often unstable.3 The philosophical 
discourse of toleration has a long history, and is intimately bound up with the 
intellectual history of liberalism. This is in great part because both the arguments 
for toleration and the intellectual history of liberalism are informed by the same 
                                                          
1 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Rousseau: “The Social Contract” and Other Later Political Writings, 
ed. Victor Gourevitch, unknown edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 151. 
2 See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 1999), 186–90; John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2005), xxiii–xxvi; See also Ten Chin Liew, “Liberal Toleration,” in A Conception Of Toleration 
(London ; New York: Cavendish Square Publishing, 2004); Chin Liew Ten, “A Conception of 
Toleration,” in A Conception Of Toleration (London ; New York: Cavendish Square Publishing, 
2004); Andrew Jason Cohen, Toleration, 1 edition (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2014), 8–18; Rainer 
Forst, Toleration in Conflict: Past and Present (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2013), 171; Susan Mendus, Toleration and the Limits of Liberalism (Atlantic Highlands, 
NJ: Humanities Pr, 1989), 3–4. 
3 Judith N. Shklar, “The Liberalism of Fear,” in Liberalism and the Moral Life, ed. Nancy L. 
Rosenblum (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991), 22; Ten Chin Liew, “Religious 
Toleration and Beyond,” in A Conception Of Toleration (London ; New York: Cavendish Square 
Publishing, 2004), 38. 
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series of historical events and motivations: the overriding theme in these events is 
that of religious conflict, and the great urgency to find a way to manage, if not 
resolve them.4 The fact that the religious and moral convictions of ordinary 
citizens can be harnessed in this manner is well attested to by history, often with 
undesirable and even disastrous effects on society and civil peace. In spite of the 
different historical context in which these issues arose and their marked difference 
from ours, roughly the same set of philosophical concerns are present, namely: 
how do we manage conflicts between people of different religious / moral 
persuasions in a manner which will allow us to coexist peacefully and fruitfully? 
This is perhaps why many still return to the arguments of Locke, Bayle, Spinoza, 
and many others, for reasons beyond antiquarian curiosity.5 
A further question can be asked about various conceptions of toleration: are 
they necessarily dependent on particular cultural, historical and political contexts 
for their persuasive force, or can they appeal to a broad audience from different 
backgrounds? As mentioned, the intellectual history of toleration over the last 500 
or so years is closely tied to the intellectual history of Liberalism, and both in 
great part are responses to the religious and political conflict in continental 
Europe, in which Christianity was the dominant cultural and religious force. It is 
thus no surprise that Locke and Bayle, two of the most prominent philosophers 
                                                          
4 This is surely not the only way for the historical relationship between toleration and liberalism to 
be understood; perhaps the problem is primarily one of political ambition, and religious 
differences are only marshalled towards this end. Thus authors such as Machiavelli have focused 
on the political use of religion, illustrating that religious piety is often only a cover for political 
motivations and ends. 




who argued for toleration appealed to aspects and doctrines of Christianity in their 
works on the subject.6 It is also interesting to note that in Christian Europe a great 
part of such conflict was not with faiths other than Christianity, but within it. Such 
doctrinal differences were not taken any less seriously by political and religious 
authorities and dissenters, and were often characterized by intolerance, often to 
the point of cruelty.7  
However, in our modern world characterized by cosmopolitanism, different 
religions (along with a growing number of secular doctrines like humanism which 
disclaim the label) can exist even within the smallest of geographical boundaries. 
It no longer seems sufficient (or even possible) for a theory of toleration to 
respond to just one dominant religious tradition or history, given that different 
peoples are now the subject and intended audience of such a theory. In this paper, 
I am primarily concerned with developing a particular conception of toleration 
which can answer the demands of our present circumstances. Contra Rousseau, I 
believe that toleration is a living possibility for many today, and I argue that it is 
possible for us to understand in a principled fashion the grounds of tolerating 
those we believe to be morally wrong. Such an account of toleration can be found 
in Rawls’ idea of Political Liberalism, and the “burdens of judgment” is a central 
element in grounding this principled account of toleration. To the extent that such 
an argument is successful, we have good reasons that underwrite the continued 
                                                          
6 See John Locke, Locke on Toleration, ed. Richard Vernon (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010); Forst, Toleration in Conflict, 185, 223; Chin Liew, “Religious Toleration 
and Beyond,” 39–47. 
7 Leonard Verduin and Franklin H. Littell, The Reformers and Their Stepchildren (Paris, Ark.: The 
Baptist Standard Bearer, 2001), 11–20, 50–51. 
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practice of toleration in a multi-cultural, multi-religious state. I begin by 
examining the concept of toleration, distinguishing it from other related attitudes 
including indifference and moral skepticism. I then provide a brief taxonomy of 
arguments for toleration: this is not meant to be exhaustive, but rather my hope is 
that it will highlight the strengths of the conception I will examine in greater 
detail later. I will then move on to examine physician assisted suicide as a case of 
moral disagreement, and attempt to draw out some implications of accepting a 
Rawlsian conception of toleration. The chief thought is that though one may not 
hold certain controversial practices like physician assisted suicide to be the right 
course of action for oneself, this is fully compatible with the (moral and legal) 
right of others to exercise it should be passed as law. However, at the level of 
constitutional and legal debate, one’s right to physician assisted suicide is far 
from being a done deal, even without including explicitly religious arguments. I 
will then reply to one critic of Rawls, and examine the relative merits of Shklar’s 
liberalism of fear and the limits of principled arguments for toleration. 
The bare bones concept of toleration 
 What is toleration? Before we begin discussing the content and appraising 
the different conceptions of toleration, it is necessary for us to analyze the concept 
itself. Fortunately, this is not an area mired in deep controversy; very roughly, 
there are 2 necessary components of the concept of toleration, formally speaking. 
Firstly, an entity A tolerates X, only if A does not actively interfere to prohibit X 
(or the practice of X) from taking place. In common parlance, entities such as 
individuals, communities, and the state are described as being tolerant, and 
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subjects of toleration. Sometimes, we even speak of belief systems and religious 
doctrines as being tolerant.8 
Secondly, if one wants to speak of A as tolerating X (regardless of 
whether X refers to behavior, practices, beliefs, or expressed views), X must be 
objectionable in some non-trivial sense to A.9 Parents sometimes tolerate the bad 
behavior of their children who they know to be feeling unwell, while recognizing 
that such behavior is normally unacceptable or objectionable. This also explains 
why, as T.S. Eliot once said, “the Christian does not want to be tolerated”, in that 
being tolerated implies that there is something bad, mistaken, or objectionable 
about the Christian’s beliefs. Thus as some have noted10, A tolerating X precludes 
A being indifferent towards X. If one does not take action against street racers 
disturbing the peace of a neighborhood because one neither likes nor dislikes it, it 
would hardly make sense to call him/her tolerant of street racing. There must be 
some degree of annoyance or disapproval present, however slight, for us to speak 
of non-interference as tolerating something. A broad survey of contemporary 
authors on the topic of toleration finds widespread acceptance on this, although 
some have argued for a more expansive definition.11 
                                                          
8 Also, the attitude and practice of toleration is sometimes distinguished. See Forst, Toleration in 
Conflict, 26; Bernard Williams, “Toleration, a Political or Moral Question?,” in In the Beginning 
Was the Deed: Realism and Moralism in Political Argument, ed. Geoffrey Hawthorn (Princeton, 
N.J: Princeton University Press, 2005), 128–30. 
9 It may very well be that the most important sense of being objectionable is a moral one, but it 
makes sense for us to speak of aesthetic (and perhaps also other senses of) objectionableness. See 
Cohen, Toleration, 14–16; Forst, Toleration in Conflict, 19. 
10 Andrew Jason Cohen, “What Toleration Is,” Ethics 115, no. 1 (2004): 71.: “Put another way, we 
must care.” 
11 David Heyd, “Education to Toleration: Some Philosophical Obstacles and Their Resolution,” in 
The Culture of Toleration in Diverse Societies: Reasonable Tolerance, ed. Catriona Mckinnon and 




An entity A tolerates X (a practice, behavior etc.) just in case that 1) A 
does not actively interfere with X, 2) A finds X objectionable in some 
non-trivial sense 
What perhaps explains the resemblance between indifference and toleration is that 
indifference produces similar effects as tolerant behavior does in many cases: the 
external effects of a person who is tolerant towards street racing may not be all 
that different from one who is indifferent – they both do not take action to 
interfere with the respective entities in question. In one case the difference 
becomes clearer: A tolerant individual may at times attempt to persuade or reason 
with the person he/she tolerates, but the indifferent individual would not be 
similarly motivated.12 Put simply, the tolerant individual cares about, and is not 
indifferent to what is being tolerated. What distinguishes the two are very 
different internal attitudes; depending on the degree of dislike, keeping oneself 
from actively interfering can potentially be quite demanding on the tolerant 
individual. The indifferent person bears no such burden. Thus, the tolerant 
individual seems to be owed an argument for the necessity and justice of 
toleration, in a way the indifferent person is not.13 While this in some ways may 
be an argument for the conclusion that indifference is preferable to toleration, in 
many prominent cases of moral and political disagreement this is extremely 
                                                          
12 Cohen, “What Toleration Is,” 85–86. 
13Heyd, “Education to Toleration: Some Philosophical Obstacles and Their Resolution,” 198.: 




difficult to achieve, given the deep seated and “non-negotiable”14 nature of many 
of our moral convictions. The history of the American debate concerning abortion 
(and regrettably at times, violent opposition) is a prime example. It is precisely 
when indifference is not an option, that toleration becomes necessary.  
Many commentators have also argued that moral skepticism is connected 
to the practice and attitude of toleration. Moral skepticism as I understand it is the 
thesis that the idea of moral value is itself questionable, that the possibility of 
moral knowledge is doubtful (in the extreme case, impossible).15 Leaving aside 
the cases of sophisticated or partial skeptics16, moral skeptics by definition do not 
(and cannot) hold that particular practice to be morally objectionable from the 
standpoint of a set of moral beliefs. If we limit the kind of objection required to 
specify tolerant behavior to moral objection, we will be forced to reason in the 
following manner: the moral skeptic may appear to exhibit tolerant behavior, but 
in actual fact does not think it morally false, wrong or mistaken. Thus the skeptic 
cannot be said to have satisfied this component of toleration. What the skeptic can 
be said to find objectionable is not a particular practice or behavior, but the idea 
of moral objectivity itself. However, it is at least conceivable that the moral 
skeptic is capable of strong feelings of dislike and disgust for others who strongly 
insist on their moral convictions. If we expand the concept of toleration to also 
                                                          
14 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 310: “...affirming such views and the conceptions of the good to 
which they give rise is recognized as non-negotiable.” 
15 See ibid., 63n18. 
16 We can conceive of a person who is skeptical about a particular area of knowledge (for instance, 
moral knowledge), but not others (e.g. scientific knowledge). See also the more radical case of 
Hobbes, for whom even scientific knowledge is not absolute: Andrew R. Murphy, “Tolerance, 
Toleration, and the Liberal Tradition,” Polity 29, no. 4 (1997): 605–8. 
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include strong feelings of dislike and disgust, then the moral skeptic can be said to 
be tolerating those he feels mistaken in strongly insisting on their particular moral 
views, or the idea of morality itself.17 Yet is sufficient for my purposes that 
toleration neither necessarily implies nor presupposes moral skepticism, though it 
may be hospitable to it.18 
We are now led to the issue of whether toleration properly applies to that 
which one finds morally objectionable, or also includes what one has a mere 
dislike of. The worry is a familiar one, and finds expression in the so called 
“paradox of the tolerant racist”: the archetypical racist has feelings of prejudice 
towards some racial or ethnic group, but does not have a reasoned (or perhaps has 
an incoherent) account of such prejudice.19 If we accept that mere dislike counts 
as relevant cases of toleration, then so long as the racist refrains from interfering 
in the said group’s activities, he is said to be tolerant. Worst still, the stronger his 
dislike and hatred, by this line of reasoning we are forced to concede, the more 
tolerant he is. 
What we ought to concede regardless, is that feelings of prejudice can be 
both strong and deep seated, sometimes even more so than the conception of 
morality that holds sway over us. Forst has thus attempted to distinguish between 
legitimate and illegitimate cases of toleration: while cases of moral objection are 
                                                          
17 I believe such skeptics are rare, and though I do not have a strongly argued conclusion, 
indifference seems to be far more likely than indignation of some sort.  
18 See Shklar, “The Liberalism of Fear,” 22, 25. 
19 Mendus, Toleration and the Limits of Liberalism, 10–12; John Horton, “Toleration as a Virtue,” 
in Toleration: An Elusive Virtue, ed. David Heyd (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 




legitimate cases of toleration, racism, sexism, and all other kinds of prejudicial 
dislike are not. Rather, the latter are feelings which we ought to do away with; 
thus the racist cannot properly be said to be tolerant. Whether this distinction can 
be sustained is beyond the scope of my essay, and I want to limit myself to 
considerations of toleration of what we find morally objectionable. Indeed, it may 
often be the case that our strong dislike of some particular practice or belief is due 
to some strong moral conviction we have. 
On the other end of the spectrum, value pluralism in its many varieties is 
also conceptually distinct from toleration. A value pluralist believes that there is a 
diversity of values, some that are mutually incompatible. Thus to instantiate some 
would mean we are not able to instantiate others.20 The value pluralist will 
acknowledge that even the values which are incompatible with ours are in some 
sense intrinsically valuable. Yet toleration in the strict sense requires us to find 
some belief, practice or value objectionable, and if so, does not properly apply to 
someone who refrains from interfering out of the belief that something is 
valuable, or should be promoted. 
While value pluralism, moral skepticism, and moral indifference are thus 
not toleration, they may still be allies of toleration, in that they may together 
better procure peaceable social relations. To briefly mention, according to 
Bernard Williams, skepticism is one of the attitudes that can support the “practice 
                                                          
20 Joseph Raz, “Autonomy, Toleration, and the Harm Principle,” in Justifying Toleration: 
Conceptual and Historical Perspectives, ed. Susan Mendus, 1 edition (Cambridge University 
Press, 2009). Consider also Mill in On Liberty: “Pagan self-assertion is one of the elements of 
human worth, as well as Christian self-denial.” 
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of toleration”, understood simply as one group putting up with the existence of 
another. Likewise, indifference may provide the only solution to some religious 
disputes, as in the case of Europe.21 That these attitudes support a tolerant society 
is by no means guaranteed, and one commentator has pointed out that skepticism 
can in principle lead to intolerance instead.22 Further elaboration on this is beyond 
the scope of my essay; I simply note that toleration is not identical to the three 
attitudes discussed, and furthermore, requires a stronger theoretical basis. 
A corollary of 1) concerns the perceived ability to interfere: to be able to 
actively interfere with the expression of opinions and / or conduct assumes that 
one is in the position to exercise such coercive force, whether directly or 
indirectly. Mendus, Brown, and others have noted that toleration only properly 
describes the group in power. According to them, the weaker group cannot be said 
to tolerate the stronger, as their non-interference is due to their lack of power to 
do so. However, as Forst has argued rightly, this is not necessarily the case: the 
weaker group can still be said to be tolerant to the extent that they will not 
interfere with the other’s practices if and when they become the stronger group.23 
Coercion can take many forms apart from the ones familiar to us, namely a 
dominant group in society who has control of the state’s lawmaking powers 
utilizing it to pass laws against what it considers to be immoral. Apart from 
                                                          
21 Bernard Williams, “Toleration: An Impossible Virtue?,” in Toleration: An Elusive Virtue, ed. 
David Heyd (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 20–21. 
22 Shklar, “The Liberalism of Fear,” 25. 
23 Forst, Toleration in Conflict, 25–26. 
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legislation, coercion can also take the form of social sanctions that interfere with 
the expression of certain views, or the conduct of certain activities. 
Thus understood, the negation of toleration is intolerance, that is, active 
interference for the sake of prohibiting the practices and / or beliefs that one 
deems objectionable. In the political context, this involves the coercive use of 
state force, or legislation, to prevent certain points of view from being expressed, 
or to prevent people from conducting themselves in certain ways. I am principally 
concerned with this political practice of toleration. However, the argument for 
toleration is not only addressed to state actors, it as much addressed to individual 
citizens who are expected to pledge allegiance to such a state.  
Is toleration a good thing? 
Separate from the question of whether toleration is an intrinsic or an 
instrumental good, is how it can be a good thing. I take it as a given that from our 
collective memory and experience of human history, we acknowledge sectarian 
conflict to be one cause of great human misery. Although violent conflicts have 
many causes and motivations, and may also involve national or ethnic divisions, 
religious strife remains a significant contributor, and has the potential to 
exacerbate other already existing tensions. Toleration that is effectively action 
guiding can help to mitigate existing religious strife, and depending on the kind of 
toleration secured, it can also secure conditions for the mutual coexistence of 
people with vastly differing moral convictions (some mutually exclusive). Beyond 
the baseline of peaceful coexistence, Scheffler highlights the fraternity that one 
can have with his fellows as one important good of toleration. The rewards 
12 
 
associated with a way of life characterized by toleration include the sense of 
enrichment that comes from developing an appreciation for forms of value 
realized in the practices of others, and the exhilaration of living confidently 
amidst the whirl of human diversity.24 According to Scheffler the bonds of 
fraternity, like the bonds of love and friendship, can hold among people who are 
in various respects critical of each other.      
But despite its perceived good, toleration is widely acknowledged to be 
something difficult, if not close to impossible. Bernard Williams puts it 
memorably when he said that toleration is most necessary when it comes to the 
intolerable.25 In the same article discussing the good of toleration, Scheffler notes 
that some people who are subject to the regime of toleration continue to find it 
threatening, because it asks us to acknowledge what we have in common with 
those who are different, that the most toxic forms of intolerance almost always 
involve ideas of purity and a denial of this commonality.26 We often need not look 
as far as the Holocaust for such examples, merely reflecting on the worst days in 
our own lives can be sufficient. Whether the actual practice of toleration by 
individuals comes at too high a doctrinal and / or psychological cost is beyond the 
scope of my discussion. Rather, the concern I want to pursue is this: can we 
provide an argument that reasonably explains why individuals, when faced with 
conduct and expression they deeply disagree with, should tolerate instead of 
                                                          
24 Samuel Scheffler, “The Good of Toleration,” in Equality and Tradition: Questions of Value in 
Moral and Political Theory, 1 edition (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 333. 
25 Williams, “Toleration: An Impossible Virtue?,” 18–19. 
26 Scheffler, “The Good of Toleration,” 333. 
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interfere with said behavior? How can such an argument be made appealing to 
people with strong and differing moral convictions? 
Toleration, a brief taxonomy 
Arguments for Toleration can be classed into two broad categories, 
principled and pragmatic. A Principled argument specifies and relies on a 
normative principle that when worked out, provides a response to the “why” 
question. In addition to the latter question, it also answers a second concern about 
where the limits of toleration lie, at least in part. One example is the still 
influential argument for toleration that relies on John Stuart Mill’s “harm 
principle”: the sole end which warrants interfering with the liberty of an 
individual is the prevention of harm to others, and in matters which merely 
concern himself, the individual is sovereign.27 Thus, in “the permanent interests of 
man as a progressive being”, one ought to tolerate expressions of opinions and 
ways of living one considers to be morally objectionable or untrue28, and one 
rightfully stops tolerating when such expression or conduct harms others.29 To the 
extent that principled arguments for toleration begin from strongly held moral 
principles, they can make strong and persuasive cases for toleration.   
On the other hand, pragmatic arguments for toleration appeal to the self-
interest of the tolerating parties, without requiring any further reference to 
normative principles. The general answer provided by pragmatic arguments to the 
                                                          
27 John Stuart Mill, “On Liberty,” in The Basic Writings of John Stuart Mill: On Liberty, the 
Subjection of Women and Utilitarianism, 2002nd ed. edition (New York; London: Modern 
Library, 2002), 11–12. 
28 Ibid., 13. 
29 See Cohen, Toleration, 34–54. 
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question “why tolerate?” is that intolerance is very likely to lead to further discord 
and conflict, and that peace is preferable to the latter by far. Thus, it is in the 
rational self-interest of the groups involved to tolerate each other for the sake of 
peace, given the current balance of interests and power. Pragmatic considerations 
are the most significant in modus vivendi type situations: in the sixteenth century, 
the warring Catholics and Protestants agreed to tolerate each other only as a kind 
of temporary armistice, their relative equality in strength making it such that the 
costs of continuing to fight far outweigh the benefits. However, should either 
party become dominant, it would impose its own religious doctrine as the sole 
admissible faith.30 Depending on the prevailing balance of power and interests, as 
well as social circumstances, such an argument for toleration can have strong and 
immediate appeal.31  
However, pragmatic considerations are subject to changing historical and 
social circumstances, and to that extent, the toleration that results from such 
considerations tends not to be enduring should pragmatic concerns be the only 
basis of toleration. Pragmatic arguments are also weak in situations where the 
parties involved are not roughly equal in strength and political influence: in the 
extreme case involving one dominant party, it is far too tempting for the stronger 
party to simply not tolerate the weaker should it disagree with its practices and 
beliefs, not to mention complete elimination of the other(s). Furthermore, it is also 
not clear that pragmatic considerations necessarily and clearly lead to toleration. 
                                                          
30 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 459. 




As C.L. Ten notes, if the aim of toleration is simply to secure peace and to avoid 
group conflicts, these aims can sometimes be achieved by persecuting the weaker 
group, or individuals within groups.32 Given the weight of other considerations, 
for example the desire of a certain group to assert what they take to be the true 
religion, and the comparative ease at which such alternative courses of action can 
be carried out by the stronger group, toleration can often seem too costly. While 
pragmatic considerations and the corresponding arguments for toleration have 
been historically important and continue to be so, if one wants a more stable and 
enduring basis for toleration, a principled argument is a better candidate by far. 
The greater part of my discussion will thus be focused on defending a principled 
argument for toleration. 
Principled arguments can be further distinguished into comprehensive and 
political kinds, following Rawls in Political Liberalism. I take a comprehensive 
argument for toleration to be one that presupposes a part (or many parts) of a 
comprehensive doctrine, defined as a more or less consistent and coherent account 
of values that aim to cover all aspects of human life. A comprehensive doctrine 
can be either philosophical or religious33: Christianity, and Mill’s philosophy both 
specify ideas of the ultimate good, and rest on claims about the essence of human 
nature.34 Some construals of Mill’s and Locke’s arguments for toleration rightly 
                                                          
32 Chin Liew Ten, “Religious Diversity, Toleration, and Interaction,” in Religious Diversity in 
Singapore, ed. Lai Ah Eng (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008), 564. 
33 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 13. 
34 See Mill, “On Liberty,” 61–66; Compare Catechism of the Catholic Church 2nd Edition 
(Doubleday, 1995), 17: “The desire for God is written in the human heart, because man is created 
by God and for God; and God never ceases to draw man to himself. Only in God will he find the 
truth and happiness he never stops searching for...” 
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place them within the “comprehensive” camp.35 Consider one of the arguments 
made by Locke in his Letter on Toleration: 
“Every mortal has an immortal soul, capable of eternal happiness or 
eternal misery, whose salvation depends upon whether in this life each 
person has done the actions and held the beliefs that are necessary to win 
the Deity’s favour and which God has prescribed…It follows…that each 
individual alone is responsible for their own salvation; for a person in no 
way violates the right of others by practising an erroneous ritual, nor does 
he do them an injury by not sharing their correct beliefs on divine matters, 
nor does his damnation diminish their happy state. I do not mean by this to 
exclude all friendly advice and willingness to refute errors; these are very 
much Christian duties. Anyone may devote as much reasoning and 
exhortation as he pleases to another’s salvation, but there must be no 
violence and no compulsion, and nothing should be done in this context 
for the sake of control over others.”36 
Regardless of our assessment of the strength of this argument, it is clear that 
Locke reasons from what he takes to be the Christian view about the soul and the 
conditions that lead to eternal life, to the conclusion of toleration: if each 
individual is ultimately only responsible for his / her salvation and eternal 
                                                          
35 Consider the argument against this view in Robert Amdur, “Rawls’s Critique of On Liberty,” in 
Mill’s On Liberty: A Critical Guide, ed. C. L. Ten, 1 edition (Cambridge, UK; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), 118–22 Though I will not address this at length, one can 
imagine that it is possible for some of Mill’s and Locke’s arguments to be suitably adapted to 
political liberalism. 
36 Locke, Locke on Toleration, 31–32. 
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happiness, then it does not matter if others have false beliefs or practices. But just 
as there are religious believers who reject the possibility of moral progress 
independent of belief in God, there are also non-believers who reject the 
immortality of the soul and the conditions of salvation from which the conclusion 
of toleration is drawn. It is clear that comprehensive arguments can have 
immediate and strong appeal to adherents of the comprehensive doctrines they 
derive their normative principles from, but can have little or no hold on those who 
reject those comprehensive doctrines. In modern society, it is taken for granted 
that citizens adhere to a variety of comprehensive doctrines. Even though there 
may be one comprehensive doctrine that has larger proportion of adherents, 
society is not homogenous enough for us to take only that doctrine into account. 
Moreover, the complexity of modern life means that more often than not we do 
participate in a political society that goes beyond our membership in communities 
united by doctrinal agreements. It is then not sufficient for us to only offer 
comprehensive arguments for toleration, however influential they are historically 
(and continue to be) for adherents of particular faiths.37 
On the other hand, a political argument for toleration does not necessarily 
presuppose any particular comprehensive doctrine. Instead, it attempts to begin 
from widely shared political values, whether publicly expressed in actual political 
life, or implicit in the way citizens relate to each other as citizens. For Rawls, as 
far as possible, a political conception of justice does not make or rely on 
                                                          
37 Comprehensive arguments can still play an important role in supporting toleration. Also, for 




controversial religious or philosophical claims. In terms of scope, a political 
conception limits itself to matters of basic justice and the framework that makes 
social cooperation possible, and makes no claims about the ultimate good. Of 
course, as a moral and substantive conception, it cannot be neutral about the good 
when it comes to all aspects of political justice. What makes a conception 
sufficiently “political” is that whatever concepts it utilizes (of the good or 
otherwise), they must have independent bases in widely shared political values. It 
must also be sufficiently “thin”, so as not to conflict with the variety of 
comprehensive doctrines that are held by individuals.  A political argument for 
toleration, in the sense discussed, likewise avoids appealing to comprehensive 
doctrines, but is compatible with them. It seeks to base toleration on a value (or a 
family of related values) that are broadly shared by in political life. 
Just as there must be limits to the idea of toleration if it is to make any 
sense, particular conceptions of toleration must also be able to specify limits of 
toleration in order for them to be of any conceptual help at all. Common sense and 
ordinary human experience both tell us that there are some things one ought not 
tolerate, thus if a particular conception of toleration is to be a good one, we should 
be able to show that it is consistent with our intuitions of where those limits lie, at 
least in clear cut cases. We may not always be able to do so in a clear and precise 
manner; indeed, even in the case of Mill’s harm principle, it may be necessary to 





The fact of reasonable pluralism and desiderata 
Until this point, I have provided an analysis of the concept of toleration, 
but little has been said about its content. To answer the question of why and how 
one ought to tolerate, it is not enough for one to merely analyze the concept but in 
addition, develop it into particular conceptions.38 In this sense toleration is well-
trodden ground in the history of political philosophy39. If the conceptual analysis 
of toleration is relatively non-controversial, specific conceptions of toleration with 
their normative (or pragmatic) assumptions prove to be far more difficult to 
evaluate vis-à-vis each other. Given the scope of my paper, it would not be 
possible, or even fruitful to conduct such an evaluation. Rather, I want to focus on 
identifying one background condition of political life that in my opinion an 
argument for toleration needs to assume, and given this background condition, 
what would be the desiderata of a suitable candidate. The background condition I 
have in mind is what Rawls calls “the fact of reasonable pluralism”.40 As I 
understand it, this means that in the absence of suppression and control (and 
perhaps even in their presence), there exists (and will exist) a plurality of 
comprehensive doctrines, some of them mutually exclusive and opposed to each 
other. This is partly the outcome of free institutions and the ordinary (and correct) 
exercise of human reason, and partly the complexity of the issues and judgments 
involved. This state of affairs will continue to persist, and in a sense, has always 
existed. For some this is a fact that is regrettable: the existence of heterodoxy and 
                                                          
38 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 9. 
39 Forst, Toleration in Conflict, 26–35. 
40 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 36–37. 
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heresy for instance, is a cause of concern for many religious believers, and 
something to be actively combated. Some others, with a Platonic conception of 
reason and truth may assert that with conscientious effort, the perfection and 
correct exercise of human reason will in time lead us to a single answer 
concerning the good.  
However for us, given the fact of reasonable pluralism, if an argument for 
toleration is to have broad appeal, it should be both principled and political in 
scope. It should not appeal to values or reasons that are part of a comprehensive 
doctrine, as it would be both unfair and unable to garner widespread support 
should it need to do so. In the next chapter, I develop a Rawlsian conception of 




2. A Rawlsian conception of toleration 
Introduction 
Is it possible to elaborate a conception of toleration that does not rest on 
controversial values? Can an account of toleration give moral convictions that lay 
claim to objective truth its proper due? In this chapter, I will argue that one 
plausible candidate which can answer our demands takes as its starting point what 
Rawls terms the “burdens of judgment”.41 I will begin by making some remarks to 
situate the account of toleration in its proper context before providing a detailed 
exposition of it. My primary goal is to explain why I find that Rawls’ argument 
from the burdens of judgment presents a compelling case for the toleration of 
what he calls “reasonable comprehensive doctrines”. I argue that if we accept that 
the burdens of judgment apply to ourselves as well as to other fellow citizens, we 
have a sufficiently strong prima facie reason to tolerate others, even if we think 
them acting in a way that we deem morally wrong. Finally, the notions of 
reciprocity, reasonableness, and mutual respect play an important role in Rawls’ 
argument, and I will conclude with how these other concepts specify the limits of 
toleration and complete his liberal account of political toleration. I note at the 
outset that it is out of the scope of this paper to consider these ideas in greater 
detail individually, and also how they fit together and support a coherent political 
                                                          
41 See John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 54–63. I 
believe it is coherent to speak in such a manner: “…not everyone agrees with assisted suicide, but 
people might agree that one has the right to it, even if they’re not themselves going to exercise it”. 
The pronouncement attributed (whether rightly or wrongly) to Voltaire expresses a similar idea: “I 
disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it.” What I offer is 
perhaps one possible explanation of why we find these to be coherent. 
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conception of liberalism. Rather I hope to show that, though it may seem 
inevitable that the appeal of toleration thus understood will be limited to those 
who accept the public political culture of a liberal society, further consideration of 
the ideas implied in the argument show that they are moral concepts which are 
(possibly) more broadly shared. 
To briefly restate my problem: the argument for toleration is addressed 
(potentially) to persons with strong and abiding religious and philosophical 
convictions. Convinced of their objective truth (and moral rightness), why should 
they not instead attempt to outlaw practices and behaviors entailed by their 
convictions to be morally wrong? Furthermore, because they hold that their 
convictions are objectively true, arguments which presuppose (or imply) moral 
relativism and skepticism will not be convincing to them. To do the work we 
require of it, an account of toleration thus has to 1) be compatible with the 
possibility of objective moral truth, and 2) give strong reason(s) why and how it 
can override our particular moral and religious convictions in such a way that 
makes toleration a possibility. 
Toleration in Rawls’ political liberalism 
It is noteworthy that Rawls himself characterizes the project he pursues in 
Political Liberalism as being concerned with toleration in an explicit way. He 
enjoins the “first fundamental question”, that of the most appropriate conception 
of justice for specifying fair terms of social cooperation between free and equal 
citizens, with a second, regarding “the grounds of toleration…given the fact of 
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reasonable pluralism as the inevitable outcome of free institutions”.42 Rawls 
further claims that “…political liberalism applies the principle of toleration to 
philosophy itself” in formulating a conception of justice which is independent of 
comprehensive philosophical and religious doctrines that are potentially 
incompatible with each other.43 Although it is in this sense “freestanding”, it can 
be the subject of an “overlapping consensus”, affirmed with reasons drawn from 
within strongly held moral and religious convictions. 
In order that it fulfill these demands, political liberalism cannot itself be 
based on a “comprehensive” conception of liberalism, or on an ultimately 
controversial and “thick” idea of say, the good of individualism or secularism. If 
so, it will be indistinguishable from the confessional states of old: the neutrality 
and impartiality of political liberalism will turn out to be nothing more than a 
thinly veiled argument which presupposes and favors one particular non-religious 
comprehensive doctrine. From a normative point of view, such an endeavor 
would be unfair and violate the “criterion of reciprocity”. Instead, Rawls 
distinguishes between “political” and “comprehensive” liberalism. This 
distinction is primarily one of scope: political liberalism does not seek to specify 
the values which apply across all areas of human life, only those relating to the 
political domain, found in the public political culture of a liberal democratic 
state.44 
                                                          
42 Ibid., 47. 
43 Ibid., 10. 
44 I will pick up the latter issue in greater detail towards the end of this chapter, specifically 
regarding whether this limits its appeal to non or less liberal peoples. 
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Furthermore, there will be intractable and serious problems if the terms of 
social cooperation require a society to be united on a particular comprehensive 
conception of the good, even if this conception is a liberal one. To achieve social 
unity based on all citizens affirming a single comprehensive conception will 
always and without exception45 require the oppressive use of force. Thus Rawls 
rules out the “liberalisms of Kant and Mill”46, and even his own Theory of Justice 
as suitable candidates for a political conception of justice. Such a conception is 
his aim in recasting his own theory, and political toleration has to be grounded on 
terms which all citizens can accept and understand independently of their 
particular comprehensive views. I now consider one important element in such a 
conception of toleration, what Rawls calls the “burdens of judgment”.47  
The burdens of judgment 
Asks Rawls, “why does our sincere and conscientious attempt to reason 
with one another fail to lead us to agreement?” In particular, disagreement 
concerning the ultimate good is a pervasive fact of almost any society, let alone 
modern societies in which may different religious and moral doctrines exist side 
by side: even in a country where the majority of citizens are of one faith, there 
will inevitably be dissenters, both within and outside the faith. For Rawls, the 
burdens of judgment are features of human reasoning that can explain why 
                                                          
45 Ibid., 37–38, n39. 
46 Ibid., 199–200; See also Isaiah Berlin, “John Stuart Mill and the Ends of Life,” in Liberty: 
Incorporating Four Essays on Liberty, ed. Henry Hardy, 2nd edition (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002).As previously mentioned, this is not to say that elements or parts of Kant and Mill’s 
philosophy cannot make up a plausible account of toleration which satisfies our demands. 
47 Also called "burdens of reason" elsewhere: cf. John Rawls, “The Domain of the Political and 
Overlapping Consensus,” in Collected Papers, ed. Samuel Freeman, Revised ed. edition (Harvard 
University Press, 2001), 475–78. 
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reasonable disagreement exists. In other words, even in the best case scenario of 
exercising their intellectual and moral powers sincerely and conscientiously, the 
tendency is for people to come to differing conclusions on questions of the true 
religion or the best way of life. It is important here to distinguish between 
reasonable and unreasonable varieties of moral disagreement. Consider the 
following passage from A Theory of Justice: 
I also suppose that men suffer from various shortcomings of knowledge, 
thought, and judgment. Their knowledge is necessarily incomplete, their 
powers of reasoning, memory, and attention are always limited, and their 
judgment is likely to be distorted by anxiety, bias, and a preoccupation 
with their own affairs. Some of these defects spring from moral faults, 
from selfishness and negligence; but to a large degree, they are simply 
part of men’s natural situation. As a consequence individuals not only 
have different plans of life but there exists a diversity of philosophical 
and religious belief, and of political and social doctrines.48 (emphasis 
mine) 
Rawls does not deny that unreasonable disagreement exists, namely due to bias, 
self-interest, and moral blindness.49 Yet the paradigm case of moral disagreement 
which demands explanation is that in which parties involved are sincere and have 
exercised their intellectual and moral powers conscientiously. How is it then, that 
instead of all roads of moral enquiry “leading to Rome”, reasonable people come 
                                                          
48 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
1999), 110. 
49 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 58. 
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to hold different (and sometimes mutually incompatible) views regarding 
religious and moral truth? “Obstacles to the correct and conscientious exercise of 
our powers of reason and judgment in the ordinary course of social life”50, the 
burdens of judgment apply to all our theoretical, practical and moral judgments: 
“a) The evidence—empirical and scientific—bearing on the case is 
conflicting and complex, and thus hard to assess and evaluate. b) Even 
where we agree fully about the kinds of considerations that are relevant, 
we may disagree about their weight, and so arrive at different judgments. 
c) To some extent all our concepts, and not only moral and political 
concepts, are vague and subject to hard cases; and this indeterminacy 
means that we must rely on judgment and interpretation (and on 
judgments about interpretations) within some range (not sharply 
specifiable) where reasonable persons may differ. d) To some extent (how 
great we cannot tell) the way we assess evidence and weigh moral and 
political values is shaped by our total experience, our whole course of life 
up to now; and our total experiences must always differ. Thus, in a 
modern society with its numerous offices and positions, its various 
divisions of labor, its many social groups and their ethnic variety, citizens’ 
total experiences are disparate enough for their judgments to diverge, at 
least to some degree, on many if not most cases of any significant 
complexity. e.) Often there are different kinds of normative considerations 
of different force on both sides of an issue and it is difficult to make an 
                                                          
50 Ibid., 56. 
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overall assessment. f) any system of social institutions is limited in the 
values it can admit so that some selection must be made from the full 
range of moral and political values that might be realized. This is because 
any system of institutions has, as it were, a limited social space. In being 
forced to select among cherished values, or when we hold to several and 
must restrict each in view of the requirements of the others, we face great 
difficulties in setting priorities and making adjustments. Many hard 
decisions may seem to have no clear answer.”51 
Since we cannot eliminate these burdens, pluralism – the existence of a variety of 
religious and philosophical views - is a permanent fact of political life, even in the 
best case scenario of sincere and conscientious individuals seeking answers to the 
questions of religious and moral truth. Thus, “conflicts arising from the burdens 
of judgment always exist and limit the extent of possible agreement.”52 A few 
commentators have noted that d) seems to be the most important, and it is not 
difficult to see why: certain insights we come to have about life (and some of that 
are relevant to moral judgment) are gleaned because of things in life we have 
experienced. Some of these experiences give rise to judgments which become the 
fixed points of our moral convictions, in ways that are impossible to predict or 
even perceive.53 These do not necessarily have to be exclusively emotional or 
                                                          
51 Ibid., 56–57. 
52 John Rawls and Samuel Richard Freeman, Collected Papers (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 2001), 613. 
53 Consider John Rawls, “On My Religion,” in A Brief Inquiry into the Meaning of Sin and Faith: 
With “On My Religion,” ed. Thomas Nagel (Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard University 
Press, 2010)., the account Rawls gives about how he lost his Christian faith. It is also not 




irrational in nature. Affirming d) is also not to deny that we can have similar 
experiences, but to acknowledge that how we arrive at our more comprehensive 
views and moral judgments is partly a function of our total life experiences, which 
are never the same in its entirety. It also seems that the burdens as described 
impose limits to the (sincere and conscientious) attempts to rationally persuade 
others of the truth of moral and religious doctrines. We may each be strongly 
convinced of our own comprehensive doctrine, yet not be able to even partially 
convince another person who is able and willing to be rationally persuaded.  
Importantly, the burdens of judgment do not (directly or indirectly) 
presuppose or lead to epistemological skepticism, which following Rawls is the 
view that “…we cannot know those objects (of knowledge) because one or more 
of the necessary conditions of knowledge can never be satisfied.”54 If it did 
presuppose the latter, it would itself rest on controversial assumptions, which very 
likely will be contested by others holding different doctrinal beliefs. In much the 
same way, the argument does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that moral 
knowledge is impossible, and is compatible with the possibility of objective moral 
and religious truth, of a comprehensive nature, points I will return to later. 
According to Rawls, the burdens of judgment are a natural feature of our 
common human reason: they apply to the free use of our practical (and 
theoretical) reason within the framework of free political institutions.55 Thus, to 
hate the fact of reasonable pluralism and the diversity it implies is to “hate human 
                                                          
54 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 63. 
55 Ibid., 56. 
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nature, for it is to hate the many not unreasonable expressions of human nature 
that develop under free institutions.”56 It is incorrect to ask if these burdens are 
too much to bear; we necessarily bear them in any and every act of everyday 
human reasoning. Thus the “burdens of judgment” have profound implications 
not just for the way we apply moral criteria in judging moral phenomenon, but 
also the adoption of those very criteria themselves. 
In summary, we began with noting that a suitable argument for toleration 
has to take seriously the possibility of truth (religious, theoretical, moral, among 
others), and also not itself be based on any single comprehensive conception of 
the good. The above discussion has made clear the following: firstly, the burdens 
do not presuppose or imply epistemological skepticism; they are compatible with 
the possibility of objective moral and religious truth. Secondly, the burdens of 
judgment are features of our common human reason, applying to its normal, 
conscientious and sincere exercise – they apply to us regardless of the particular 
comprehensive doctrines we happen to hold. Accepting the burdens of judgment 
also does not depend on accepting any particular comprehensive doctrine. Hence, 
the above considerations show that an argument for toleration based on the 
burdens of judgment is at least provisionally suitable, when such an argument is 
potentially addressed to those who each claim objective truth for their own 
conception of the good, and whose conceptions are mutually incompatible. In the 
                                                          
56 Rawls and Freeman, Collected Papers, 479. 
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following discussion, I will complete the argument with other related concepts 
found in Rawls’ Political Liberalism. 
An argument for toleration from the burdens of judgment 
If one accepts that the burdens of judgment applies to all citizens 
(including oneself), an argument for toleration begins to take shape: 
1) The burdens of judgment apply to all instances of human reasoning 
under normal conditions. 
2) If 1), then even in the best case scenario of (exercising one's powers of 
reasoning conscientiously and sincerely), different people can (and very 
likely will) arrive at different conclusions regarding the ultimate questions 
of value, religious and moral truth. 
3) (1, 2) Even in the best case scenario, people may (and very likely will) 
come to different conclusions regarding the ultimate questions of value, 
religious and moral truth. (fact of reasonable pluralism) 
4) (3) If there exists a true comprehensive conception of the good, it can 
be reasonably rejected by others who have exercised their powers of 
reasoning conscientiously and sincerely. 
 (4) is entailed by the discussion in the preceding section detailing (1) – (3): 
consider the case in which an individual has conscientiously exercised his powers 
of theoretical and practical reason, and sincerely believes that he /she has arrived 
at the true conception of the good. Assume for the sake of argument that it this in 
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fact true, not merely sincerely held to be true. However even in this case, which is 
the best case scenario, others who are similarly sincere and conscientious may not 
come to the same conclusion, due to the burdens of judgment. They may hence 
come to reasonably reject what is the true conception of the good.57 Yet it is not 
obvious that (4) directly implies the conclusion we sought, that we ought to 
tolerate others. In order to complete the account of toleration, a bridging premise 
(5) is required. This is what makes Rawls’ account of toleration ultimately a 
liberal one. 
5) It is unfair (unreasonable) to impose through coercive force what can be 
reasonably rejected. Citizens owe each other a moral duty of fairness, 
specified in terms of mutual respect and reciprocity. (liberal principle of 
legitimacy).  
6) (4, 5) To coercively interfere in order to enforce a particular 
comprehensive conception of the good, even if it is true, is unfair 
(unreasonable) 
7) (6) We ought to (mutually) tolerate different conceptions of ultimate 
value, even if we think them to be mistaken or morally wrong. 
The notion of reasonableness in 5) requires further exposition. There is both a 
descriptive and normative dimension to reasonableness. The descriptive 
dimension specifies reasonableness in terms of reasoning capabilities: powers of 
thought and judgment, the ability to draw inferences, weigh evidence, and balance 
                                                          
57 Once again, unreasonable disagreements are always a possibility. 
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competing considerations.58 To be unreasonable in this sense is to fail to exercise 
those capabilities conscientiously, and / or to recognize that the burdens of 
judgment apply to our judgments as well as those of others, hence limiting our 
ability to come to the same conclusions on theoretical as well as practical matters. 
The normative dimension is found in Rawls’ distinction between the reasonable 
and the rational: while the rational aspect concerns the choosing, ordering and 
pursuit of the ends of life, the reasonable aspect consists of the ability and 
willingness to honor fair terms of social cooperation among equals, provided 
others can be reasonably expected to do likewise.59 To be unreasonable in this 
sense is to be unwilling to honor, or even to propose, “except as a necessary 
public pretense”, any general principles or standards for specifying fair terms 
when taking part in cooperative schemes, and are ready to violate such terms as 
suits their interests when circumstances allow.60 While reasonableness admits of 
varying degrees, a certain minimum threshold is all that is sufficient for the 
Rawlsian argument to work, and anyone with a normally functioning sense of 
justice can meet this threshold.61 
5) completes the argument by introducing the liberal political context and 
institutional identity of a citizen within a liberal state. The argument is ultimately 
moral (as opposed to legal)62 in character, since the exercise of political and 
lawmaking powers must themselves be answerable to the principle, and not the 
                                                          
58 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 55. 
59 Ibid., 48–54. 
60 Ibid., 50. 
61 See John Rawls, “The Sense of Justice,” in Collected Papers, ed. Samuel Freeman, Revised ed. 
edition (Harvard University Press, 2001), 96–116. 
62 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 147–48. 
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other way round. Rawls tries to sidestep the problem of controversial and 
comprehensive moral doctrines in a twofold manner: in terms of scope, he 
restricts his conception of liberalism to the political domain, to what he calls the 
basic structure or constitutional essentials.63 In terms of the affirmation or denial 
of any particular religious or philosophical doctrine, his political liberalism 
remains agnostic about their truth, and aims not to appeal to controversial values. 
It also follows that the common resources of the state ought not be used to support 
or suppress any particular comprehensive doctrine, at least insofar as they are 
reasonable.64 
Some things may worry us at this point. 5), which is necessary for us to 
come to the conclusion we want, requires us to acknowledge that citizens have a 
moral duty of fairness, specified in terms of reciprocity and mutual respect (at the 
very least). These are substantive political principles, and in order for them to 
have widespread assent, they must be specified in terms all citizens can be 
reasonably expected to endorse. As we have seen, one sure way to fail this 
requirement is for these principles necessarily depend on a particular 
comprehensive and controversial conception of the good. Can we avoid deriving 
                                                          
63 Ibid., 442–43. 
64 Interestingly, Rawls himself seems to exercise restraint even in his discussion of religious 
doctrines and controversial issues: he pursues what he calls a “method of avoidance”. Consider 
ibid., 138: “Here it is important to stress that this reply does not say, for example, that the doctrine 
extra ecclesiam nulla salus is not true. Rather, it says that those who want to use the public’s 
political power to enforce it are being unreasonable (II:3). That does not mean that what they 
believe is false. A reply from within a comprehensive view—the kind of reply we should like to 
avoid in political discussion—would say that the doctrine in question is a misapprehension of the 
divine nature, and hence not true.” 
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the principles of political right from a particular comprehensive conception 
(whether liberal or not), or is it unavoidable? 
A positive answer then depends on our being able to understand and 
accept the principles of reciprocity and mutual respect in a suitably impartial way, 
on terms that are broadly shared. In the following section, I argue that there are 
good reasons for us to think that the conception of toleration just elaborated can 
have the broad appeal we are seeking.65 I try to set the groundwork by first 
discussing the special domain of the political, and the political identity of a 
citizen. 
The Political domain and political identity of citizens  
If the burdens of judgment apply so broadly to all areas of human 
reasoning, what makes us think that individuals will not likewise disagree about 
constitutional essentials, especially the basis of toleration itself? As Rawls asks, 
“…how can we affirm our comprehensive doctrine and yet hold that it would not 
be reasonable to use state power to gain everyone’s allegiance to it?” What makes 
us think that political values, the ones that ground toleration, can normally 
outweigh other values that conflict with them? The answer depends partly on 
                                                          
65 Consider Salman Rushdie, in Boundaries of Toleration, ed. Alfred Stepan and Charles Taylor, 3 
edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014), 30: “…Well, to put it in nontheoretical 
terms, the desire of human beings to get along with each other is not culturally specific. The desire 
of human beings to be able to put up with their neighbors, even if they play the radio too loud or 
pick their noses, is something which, in the end, we all kind of feel. I think we try to get along 
with each other, and I feel that’s a thing that does not have to do with culture. It’s a thing that we 
have to do every day; we try to get along with people next-door even if they’re not like us. All this 
is sort of elevating that to a much grander scale. I do think there is a perfectly nonculturally 
specific idea of tolerance which can be used in this context.” 
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recognizing certain features of the political domain, as well as acknowledging the 
shared political identity of a citizen. 
Firstly, Rawls distinguishes between non-voluntary and voluntary 
associations, of which the political belongs to the former. One enters the political 
association by birth and exits only by death – we “come to be within it”, having 
no prior political or non-political identity.66 Making a concession for the 
possibility of emigration (which Rawls assumes away), it is still extremely 
difficult for us to leave political society, in a way that voluntary associations are 
not.67 Next, political power is necessarily coercive power backed by the 
government’s use of sanctions and regularly imposed on all citizens, some of 
whom may not accept the stated rationale for their exercise.68 Because of the 
coercive nature of the laws (as well as other powers exercised by the state) and 
the fact that they are meant to apply generally, an arbitrary or biased application 
of these powers under normal conditions not only offends our sense of justice, but 
is oppressive. Together these two considerations explain why the political domain 
is distinct and special: to treat it in the same way we treat a religious association is 
to disregard important differences between them.  
Lastly, we can distinguish our institutional identity69 from our non-
political identity. While in many cases persons mostly identify with the latter - it 
                                                          
66 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 135–36. 
67 One may ask: what about traditional societies, it is equally if not more difficult to leave a 
religion (community)? This is an interesting question to which I will not attempt to give a further 
answer, except to highlight our context of modern political societies, of which the relative ease of 
leaving a voluntary association is a fairly accurate description. 
68 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 136. 
69 I use the terms “institutional identity” and “political identity” interchangeably. 
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being the locus of their idea of a good life and ultimate value, we nevertheless can 
sensibly speak of each of us as having an independent political identity as 
citizens. Rawls acknowledges that our allegiance to our comprehensive doctrines 
can be strong and uncompromising, but a change in our comprehensive doctrines 
does not necessarily imply a change in our institutional identity: on the road to 
Damascus Saul of Tarsus becomes Paul the Apostle70, but despite this he remains 
a Roman citizen. As citizens qua citizens, we have a political identity that is 
independent and irreducible to our non-political identities. This is not to say that 
they are not related – they may in fact be mutually reinforcing or sometimes in 
conflict – but merely that they are distinct. 
If the character of political life is non-voluntary and concerns how 
coercive force is used legitimately, and if we can in addition make sense of the 
institutional identity of a citizen, how can these help us in providing an answer to 
our initial question? According to Rawls, political values are “very great values 
and not easily overridden”. But we can ask, in what sense are they very great 
values? Must they be “greater” than the values within our comprehensive 
doctrines in order for them to always have priority under normal conditions? 
Rawls answers as follows: “…these values govern the basic framework of social 
life—the very groundwork of our existence”. The latter is a phrase borrowed from 
Mill, and the context in which it resides gives us a clue to its significance: 
                                                          
70 Ibid., 31–32, 31n34. 
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“…but security no human being can possibly do without…Now this 
most indispensable of all necessaries, after physical nutriment, cannot 
be had, unless the machinery for providing it is kept unintermittedly 
in active play. Our notion, therefore, of the claim we have on our 
fellow-creatures to join in making safe for us the very groundwork of 
our existence, gathers feelings around it so much more intense than those 
concerned in any of the more common cases of utility…”71 (emphasis 
mine) 
In context, the “very great good” turns out to be that of personal security. Mill 
understands the importance and worth of personal security in terms of the value 
schema of Utilitarianism, but it is not difficult to see how security is also 
important to Kantians, Christians and Atheists alike. All of those groups will have 
strong abiding interests in leading their own lives according to their deepest moral 
convictions, and the very precondition for the possibility of lives lived in pursuit 
of their chosen conception of the good is the security and stability that a just 
social structure provides. Reasonable citizens can recognize that personal security 
is something all persons require, regardless of their more specific ideas of the 
good. Even the wish that more come to share their own comprehensive views 
cannot be fulfilled without securing this condition for others.72 The good of 
personal security is broadly shared, and as far as principles go, requires no further 
                                                          
71 Ibid., 139, 139n6. Cf. John Stuart Mill, “Utilitarianism,” in The Basic Writings of John Stuart 
Mill: On Liberty, the Subjection of Women and Utilitarianism, 2nd ed. (New York; London: 
Modern Library, 2002), 290–91. 
72 I will concede that it is entirely possible that had historical conditions been different, very 
different solutions may obtain.  
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defense. And so long as the ideas of the good utilized can be broadly shared, it is 
consistent with the principle of fairness. 
We may be worried at this point that the argument advanced turns out to 
be reducible to a consideration of mutual self-interest. Is the argument is not a 
principled defense of toleration, but a “mere modus vivendi”? Thus the good of 
security could possibly be understood in two distinct ways: if we specify it in the 
sense of reasonable or fair behavior, it means that we desire for its own sake a 
social world which upholds security for all. This seems consistent with the idea of 
a sense of fairness, and is non-reductive. Alternatively, we can understand the 
good of security as mutual advantage – that is, its value is ultimately reducible to 
considerations of self-interest: we want a social world which is stable and secure 
because such an environment enables us to fulfill our own interests. To tolerate 
out of the desire for a peaceful social world because the alternative is worse for 
our own interests is not to make a principled argument for toleration. I return to 
this worry in my concluding chapter.  
At the present moment I take for granted that citizens do have a mutually 
recognized institutional identity, share a common human reason, as well as a 
sense of justice. Even if they are not acting out of it in full compliance, it is 
possible for them to recognize and develop over time their capacity and 
willingness to do so. While the temptation to violate just norms is an ever present 
possibility, citizens can be brought to understand and recognize the duty of 
fairness towards others. An argument can perhaps proceed as follows: to impose 
beliefs on others which can be reasonably rejected is to not sufficiently respect the 
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fact that others are capable of judging the facts of the matter for themselves. In 
other words, it is to not respect the moral personhood of the person we are 
attempting to coerce. Thus the very fact we recognize that we each have an 
institutional identity and relate to each other in a special way within the political 
domain specifies for us the limits of what we can claim, and also the necessity of 
what we owe to each other, qua citizen.  
Reciprocity and Mutual Respect 
The institutional identity of a citizen involves many aspects, and I focus 
on two main ones, the ideas of reciprocity and mutual respect. It is important to 
note that in our discussion, an individual who tolerates another believes him to be 
from his comprehensive moral standpoint, mistaken or wrong. I will attempt to 
show that the ideas of reciprocity and mutual respect can be understood in a way 
that does not contradict this. 
The concept of reciprocity has an important place in Political 
Liberalism.73 Rawls introduces the “criterion of reciprocity” in order to answer 
the following question: “…By what ideals and principles, …are citizens as 
sharing equally in ultimate political power to exercise that power so that each of 
them can reasonably justify their political decisions to each other?”74 The 
criterion of reciprocity states that the exercise of political power is proper only 
when we sincerely believe that the reasons we offer for our political action may 
                                                          
73 See Rawls, Political Liberalism, xlvii., on liberal conceptions: “Any conception that meets the 
criterion of reciprocity and recognizes the burdens of judgment(II:2) is a candidate.” 
74 Ibid., 445–46. 
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reasonably be accepted by other citizens as a justification of those actions.75 Thus 
the liberal principle of legitimacy is derivative of the criterion of reciprocity. 
According to Rawls, the ideal of reciprocity lies between altruism (being moved 
by the general good), and mutual advantage.76 It is not altruistic because it is 
concerned for the intersubjective good of others in relation to ourselves, and not 
solely with the interests of others to the exclusion of ours. It is not mutual 
advantage as it is not concerned with everyone’s being advantaged with respect to 
one’s present or expected situation.77 Once again the burdens of judgment come 
to mind: the idea here is not simply acceptance but reasonable acceptance. The 
reasons we provide to others must be those that when provided to us, we can 
likewise reasonably accept. 
If this is the case, then to act in ways satisfying the criterion of reciprocity 
is neither to give up on the truth of one’s comprehensive moral position nor to 
acknowledge the truth of one’s opponents’. It is rather to not support any policy, 
and to reject the use of state force in order to enforce it, if it cannot be shown to 
be acceptable (non-rejectable) to other reasonable citizens, who may not share 
one’s comprehensive doctrines. Consider the following reason provided by Rawls 
in rejecting Kant and Mill’s comprehensive liberalisms as candidates for a 
political conception of justice, even that of a liberal society: 
“While autonomy as a moral value has had an importance place in the 
history of democratic thought, it fails to satisfy the criterion of reciprocity 
                                                          
75 Ibid., xlii. 
76 Ibid., 50. 
77 Ibid., 16–17. 
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required of reasonable political principles and cannot be part of a political 
conception of justice. Many citizens of faith reject moral autonomy as part 
of their way of life.” 
The spirit of the complaint (whether one believes it to be strong or weak) is that if 
accepted as a basis for the basic structure of political society which includes all 
citizens, the comprehensive liberalisms of Kant or Mill will be intolerant in 
asserting (and imposing) an ultimate conception of the good that can be 
reasonably rejected by citizens who do not share it. This is of course not to say 
that certain elements of the philosophy of Kant and Mill (e.g. political autonomy 
or the harm principle) that pass the test of reciprocity cannot be part of the 
political conception.  
Next, can mutual respect be understood in a such a way that similarly 
respects claims of objective truth, or must mutual respect be based on some kind 
of positive appraisal of another’s beliefs or actions? A distinction made by 
Stephen Darwall between two different attitudes of respect one can have for 
others can perhaps help us make sense of our possibilities. According to Darwall, 
Recognition respect consists in giving appropriate consideration or recognition to 
some feature of its object in deliberating about what to do. On the other hand, 
appraisal respect consists in an attitude of positive appraisal of that person either 
as a person or as engaged in some particular pursuit.78 Unlike recognition respect, 
                                                          
78 Stephen L. Darwall, “Two Kinds of Respect,” Ethics 88, no. 1 (1977): 38. I owe this point to Ian 
Carter, “Are Toleration and Respect Compatible?,” Journal of Applied Philosophy 30, no. 3 
(August 1, 2013): 195–208. 
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appraisal respect “does not itself consist in that behavior or in the judgment that is 
appropriate. Rather, it consists in the appraisal itself.”79 
Importantly, to respect something in the sense of recognition respect is to 
“regard it as something to be reckoned with…and to act accordingly”. In a narrow 
construal of recognition respect as a moral attitude, to respect something is thus to 
regard it as requiring restrictions on the moral acceptability of actions connected 
with it: one is not free, from a moral point of view, to act as one pleases in matters 
concerning something which is an appropriate object of recognition respect in the 
moral sense.80 To have recognition respect for some moral fact or feature is to 
regard the latter as itself placing restrictions on what it is permissible for one to 
do.81 What feature or fact is the appropriate one may be a matter of dispute.  
However, if this distinction can indeed be sustained, we have a plausible 
way of understanding mutual respect which does not require us to affirm the value 
or truth of another’s comprehensive doctrine or actions. In our conception of 
toleration, the way citizens mutually respect each other is in recognizing the 
features of moral personhood shared by all of them: that they each have the ability 
to conceive and deliberate about ultimate ends, as well as a normally functioning 
sense of justice. In a related way, mutual respect is expressed in the shared way 
which public reasoning proceeds: in justifying the use of political power, we are 
to appeal only to presently accepted general beliefs and forms of reasoning found 
in common sense, and the methods and conclusions of science when these are not 
                                                          
79 Darwall, “Two Kinds of Respect,” 39. 




controversial.82 Recognizing the features of moral personhood thus set limits on 
how we may treat others, without presupposing a positive assessment of the 
person’s comprehensive beliefs. In fact, we will have a strong reason to tolerate 
others, independently of even a potentially negative assessment of their beliefs or 
behavior (insofar as they are reasonable). This is why,  
“…we may with perfect consistency hold that it would be unreasonable to 
use political power to enforce our own comprehensive view, which we 
must, of course, affirm as either reasonable or true.”83 
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, I now want to recap some key points and offer a few brief 
remarks. As discussed in our previous chapter, to tolerate something (a particular 
behavior, action, person, or belief) in a moral sense, is to think it morally wrong 
or mistaken, yet to take no action to coercively interfere with it. In an act of 
toleration, the acceptance component (which provides a reason to not interfere) 
overrides the objection component, the reason why the thing in question is 
morally wrong or objectionable. As shown, Rawls’ argument for toleration is 
addressed to those with firm commitment to the objective truth of their own 
comprehensive doctrine. From the points of view of those comprehensive 
doctrines, they may find certain practices to be morally objectionable. The 
acceptance component is made up of two parts, recognizing and accepting that the 
                                                          
82 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 224. 
83 Ibid., 138. 
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burdens of judgment apply to all, and that citizens qua citizens have a moral duty 
of fairness towards each other, specified in terms of reciprocity and mutual 
respect. The moral duty of fairness prohibits imposing a particular set of beliefs or 
particular code of moral conduct if it can be reasonably rejected by others, just as 
it prohibits coercively interfering with others whose conduct meets the threshold 
of reasonableness. To do so would be unfair, and unreasonable.84 
In analyzing some ideas related to the liberal principle of legitimacy, I 
hoped to show that they do not appeal to a particular comprehensive conception 
of a metaphysical or religious kind. These ideas can be specified in an ordinary 
manner, in ways that the ideal of citizenship already implies. Insofar as actual 
political life expresses the ideal of citizenship, these concepts and values are 
likewise instantiated in our political world. In a sufficiently just social and 
political context, one recognizes they are concepts that are implied in the way 
citizens already relate to each other, or can be expected to do so. While there are 
certainly other important values and concepts relevant to strengthening the case of 
political liberalism, I chose to focus on the two mentioned in great part because of 
their broad appeal. It is thus easier to make a case on this basis than the value of 
autonomy, or the “permanent interests of man as a progressive being”. Yet any 
sensible account of toleration needs to draw in a principled way the line between 
things which ought and ought not be tolerated. Our account provides an indication 
as to where the limits of toleration may lie: in the reasonable rejectability of a 
                                                          
84 Furthermore, that it is a real possibility for the political values just elaborated to be overridden is 
never denied by Rawls, and ample examples from history and even daily life are constant 
reminders of this possibility. 
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certain practice. In the next chapter, I will examine the controversial issue of 





3. Toleration and controversial issues 
Introduction 
What does a liberal, Rawlsian conception of toleration lead to in practice? 
Reasonable people can and very often do disagree about the moral permissibility 
of certain controversial practices. One who accepts a Rawlsian account of 
toleration previously discussed - based on the recognition and acceptance of the 
burdens of judgment, as well as the duty of fairness towards other citizens – 
almost certainly also has an allegiance to a particular comprehensive conception. 
Such a comprehensive conception and the principles embodied within it may give 
rise to strong misgivings about the moral wrongness of many practices. These 
include religious opposition to physician-assisted suicide, abortion, and 
homosexuality. It is thus inevitable that some citizens will disagree on moral 
grounds with certain actions that are within the province of state legislation. If 
reasonable people disagree about the moral permissibility of certain practices just 
like they disagree about the truth of comprehensive conceptions of the good, does 
it follow that they are never to be legally permissible? In other words, ought we 
(morally and legally) tolerate the practice of controversial practices if we have 
strong convictions against them? If doctrinal disputes within and between 
comprehensive conceptions of the good have been intractable, then we can expect 
the debate about the permissibility of abortion and physician-assisted suicide to be 
similarly intractable. How should citizens go about the process of debating and 
passing such laws?  
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In this chapter, I offer some brief remarks on how a tolerant citizen ought 
to consider these issues. What I do not offer is a complete argument for or against 
abortion or euthanasia, even as I suggest in passing some possible conclusions 
such a society can collectively come to. While many arguments for abortion and 
euthanasia in applied ethics are deeply complex and worth examining, I cannot 
examine their individual merits and strengths here. Furthermore, in democratic 
societies, public policy and legislation is a matter of a complex, irreplaceable 
political process of debate and discussion, and without further contextual details 
the provision of which is beyond the scope of my paper, one cannot predict with 
certainty the outcome of such a debate. At the risk of repetition, what I focus on is 
not primarily the merits of the arguments themselves, but the kind of argument 
which is being made, and to show how citizens can engage with each other in a 
tolerant manner, while not compromising on their comprehensive moral views. 
 I begin by briefly discussing Rawls’ views on public reason, and his 
application to the topic of abortion. Without delving too deeply into its intricacies, 
I hope to highlight the strengths of proceeding by way of public reason for 
citizens divided on comprehensive doctrines. Arguing for a position in terms of 
widely shared political values that can be appreciated independently of specific 
comprehensive doctrines is itself based in, and expresses mutual respect. Because 
the laws that are to govern social dealings within a liberal state are meant to apply 
to all, citizens ought to take this into account. While individuals are committed to 
comprehensive doctrines that may be against certain controversial practices, they 
have common interests and a common way of reasoning about those interests that 
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may allow for them. In other words, other citizens potentially have the legal right 
to do wrong in a moral sense, by their own lights, and this legal right is secured 
by the judicial process and the duty of fairness towards others, as laws are meant 
to apply generally. I then examine Weithman’s arguments against “The 
Philosopher’s Brief”, showing that arguments in terms of public reasons can be 
made against assisted suicide as well. One way in which citizens can move 
beyond the impasse of mutually incompatible and conflicting comprehensive 
doctrines is by arguing and discussing the issues within the realm of public 
reasons. Public reasons appeal to widely shared and independent political values, 
and concerns that are common to all citizens regardless of their convictions. 
Contrary to what some have argued, public reason is not unfairly biased against 
religious doctrines: it remains agnostic as to their truth, and does not favor secular 
comprehensive doctrines. Rather, it seeks common ground. Thus, Weithman’s 
line of argumentation against the constitutional protection of assisted suicide is 
advanced along professional and medical grounds. The arguments advanced by 
Weithman can be appreciated independently of specific comprehensive doctrines, 
for they appeal to a shared concern for maintaining the integrity of the medical 
profession. I end by discussing the special case of healthcare professionals who 
may be placed in situations that obligate them to perform procedures they oppose 
from a moral point of view. I argue that they be granted the right of conscience to 





Rawls on public reason and controversial issues 
By his own profession, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited” contains 
Rawls’ “best statement…of public reason and political liberalism.”85 In it, Rawls 
suggests a way of proceeding on controversial issues, including making short 
remarks on abortion and homosexuality. Before examining those remarks, I first 
outline and reconstruct the idea of public reason and how it is supposed to work, 
then discuss in detail the way controversial issues are meant to be debated and 
decided upon, according to public reason.  
The shift to public reason is motivated by concerns similar to those that 
animated Political Liberalism: citizens realize they cannot reach agreement or 
even mutual understanding on the basis of their irreconcilable comprehensive 
doctrines, and thus need to consider what kinds of reason they may reasonably 
give each other when fundamental political questions are at stake.86 Firstly, public 
reason is restricted in scope, in the following senses: 1) it applies only to 
fundamental political questions, 2) it applies in a strict sense to public officials in 
their public capacity, 3) its content given by a family of reasonable political 
conceptions of justice, 4) the application of these conceptions in discussions of 
coercive norms to be enacted in the form of legitimate law for a democratic 
people.87 Usually discussed in the language of rights and liberties, abortion and 
euthanasia can be considered matters of basic justice; in light of the criteria just 
mentioned, they appear to fall well within the scope of public reasoning. The 
                                                          
85 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 438. 
86 Ibid., 441. 
87 Ibid., 442. 
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intuitive idea of public reason applying to public officials in their lawmaking 
capacity is not difficult to understand: ideally, public officials are not to act from 
and for narrow personal, religious and political interests, but from and for the 
common good. However, the ideal (as distinguished from idea) of public reason is 
also realized by citizens who are not public officials88: ideally, citizens are to 
think of themselves as if they were legislators and ask themselves what statutes, 
supported by reasons satisfying the criterion of reciprocity89, they would think 
most reasonable to enact.90 Citizens also have a moral duty of civility to hold 
public officials accountable to standards of public reason. Taken together, public 
reason has an important role in the public life of a citizen, even when they are not 
legislators directly voting on the passage of laws.91 
A second important point is that public reason is linked to reciprocity and 
legitimacy. According to Rawls, a citizen engages in public reason when he or she 
deliberates within a framework of what he or she sincerely regards as the most 
reasonable political conception of justice, a conception that expresses political 
values others as free and equal citizens might also be expected to reasonably 
endorse.92 The content of public reason is given by a family of political 
conceptions of justice rather than a single conception, the limiting feature of this 
                                                          
88 Ibid., 444–45. 
89 Ibid., 446: “The criterion of reciprocity requires that when those terms are proposed as the most 
reasonable terms of fair cooperation, those proposing them must also think it at least reasonable 
for others to accept them, as free and equal citizens, not as dominated and manipulated, or under 
pressure of an inferior political or social position.” 
90 The Kantian spirit of this ideal is acknowledged by Rawls. See ibid., 445n16. 
91 It is important to note that public reason does not apply to the “background culture”, the culture 
and contexts of religious bodies and other associations, only to the “public forum”. See ibid., 442–
43. 
92 Ibid., 450. 
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family being the criterion of reciprocity, applied between free and equal citizens 
that are reasonable and rational.93 One of the most important parts of Rawls’ 
argument concerns how legitimate law is arrived at: 
“…when, on a constitutional essential or matter of basic justice, all 
appropriate government officials act from and follow public reason, and 
when all reasonable citizens think of themselves ideally as if they were 
legislators following public reason, the legal enactment expressing the 
opinion of the majority is legitimate law. It may not be thought the most 
reasonable, or the most appropriate, by each, but it is politically (morally) 
binding on him or her as a citizen and is to be accepted as such.”94 
(emphasis mine) 
It is interesting to note that it is not the mere majority of votes, but in addition, 
deliberating and voting following public reason that makes a law legitimate. Thus, 
for Rawls, a citizen is required (by the duty of honoring a legitimate law) to 
tolerate a practice that he considers immoral from his comprehensive doctrine, if 
in fact a legitimate law is passed permitting it by way of public reason. The 
citizen need not himself exercise the right to participate in the practice he 
considers immoral, but only to honor the right of others to choose to do so.95 
                                                          
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid., 446. This formulation comes very close to Rousseau’s notion of the general will, and 
Kant’s idea of universal moral legislation. 
95 Ibid., 480. Some familiar cases come to mind: gambling, prostitution, abortion, same-sex 
marriage, and assisted suicide. When legalized, these activities do not directly require anyone to 
actively participate, only to abstain from coercively interfering. 
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Thirdly and crucially, public reasoning aims for public justification, 
appealing to political conceptions of justice, and to ascertainable evidence and 
facts open to public view. It is not simply valid reasoning, but argument addressed 
to others (qua citizens): “it proceeds correctly from premises we accept and think 
others could reasonably accept to conclusions we think they could also reasonably 
accept.”96 Public reasoning proceeds entirely within a political conception of 
justice: reasoning in a public manner is conducted exclusively in terms of political 
values. Such values include “…justice, domestic tranquility, the common defense, 
the general welfare…”, among others.97 To those we can add the familiar liberal 
values of equality and freedom. Public reason is not about “specific political 
institutions or policies”, but the kind of reasons that citizens are to appeal to in 
making political justifications to one another when they support laws and 
policies.98 In addition, it is not just the abovementioned concepts that are obtained 
from within a political conception or public political culture, but also the way they 
are understood. Consider the examples of autonomy and toleration: each of these 
concepts can have a purely political meaning, or can proceed from (and be 
understood in terms of) a comprehensive doctrine.99 Political values thus have 
independent validity from the point of view of citizens, regardless of the 
comprehensive doctrines they adhere to. To mutually reason from this shared 
common ground is not only to express reciprocity, but also fairness. 
                                                          
96 Ibid., 465. 
97 Ibid., 453. 
98 Ibid., 476. 
99 See ibid., 455–56. for Rawls’ discussion of autonomy, and 461-462 for his discussion of 
toleration. Of course, the distinction between two possible ways is not always clear, and they can 
have significant overlaps. However, the political sense is primary. 
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The following should now be clear: firstly, if public reasoning is followed 
conscientiously, the process of lawmaking in a democratic political setting does 
not simply exclude religious reasons for the sake of obtaining liberal or 
permissive outcomes. If Rawls is correct, then the “playing field” is in a sense 
level between religious and secular comprehensive doctrines.100 Citizens with 
secular comprehensive doctrines must likewise offer public reasons for their 
proposals. Secondly, public reasoning (and political liberalism) is agnostic with 
respect to the truth of religious comprehensive doctrines, as with secular and 
philosophical comprehensive doctrines, instead beginning from widely shared 
political values. In addition, Rawls allows for comprehensive doctrines to be 
brought into public debate, provided in due course public reasons are provided.101 
Doing so allows citizens to mutually understand each other’s points of view, and 
also for discourse to begin when political values are weak and not widely shared. 
We can now begin to understand how controversial issues are to be 
publicly debated and voted on, ideally speaking. To reiterate, public reason is 
concerned with the permissible kind of reasons offered in support of a law or 
public policy: such reasons are provided in terms of political values from political 
conceptions of justice that satisfy the criterion of reciprocity. Two examples from 
Rawls can perhaps help us demonstrate just what kind of reasons and cases are 
legitimately raised from the point of view of public reason, the controversial 
issues of same-sex marriages, and abortion. For Rawls, the state has a legitimate 
                                                          
100 Ibid., 457–58. 
101 Ibid., 453, 463–64. 
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interest in in the family insofar as is interested in the institutions that are needed 
to reproduce political society over time. Given this interest, the government 
would appear to have no interest in the particular form of family life, or of 
relations among the sexes, except if they affect the orderly reproduction of society 
over time.102 Rawls then distinguishes illegitimate from legitimate kinds of values 
from which the government may adduce support for defending a particular form 
of the family: on the one hand, appeals to monogamy as such and against same-
sex marriages are not permissible, if they only reflect comprehensive doctrines. 
On the other hand, if it were true that same-sex marriages are destructive to the 
raising of children, the state would have a public reason to oppose same-sex 
marriages on that ground.103 Another example is Rawls’ discussion of Cardinal 
Joseph Bernadin’s attempt to argue against the right to abortion on the basis of 
three political values, namely public peace, essential protections of human rights, 
and the commonly accepted standards of moral behavior in a community of 
law.104 Such an argument is acceptable from the point of view of public reasoning 
as it makes no reference to comprehensive religious doctrines, only to widely 
shared political values.105  
                                                          
102 Ibid., 456–57. 
103 Same sex-marriage being destructive to the raising of children is more appropriately a public 
reason in objection to adoption and artificial insemination, and less so to same-sex marriage. I owe 
this point to A/P Tan Sor Hoon. Perhaps a better characterization of a public reason to oppose 
same-sex marriage is if it were true that legalizing it would be inimical to the reproduction of 
political society in significant ways. 
104 Ibid., 480n82. 




From this it follows that some controversial issues are far from settled or 
biased in favor of liberal conclusions, and legislation that can pass the muster of 
public reason must be based on an assessment of the balance of arguments in 
terms of political values and the public good. I now move on to examine in brief 
the arguments raised by Dworkin and Weithman on the constitutional protection 
of the right to assisted suicide, showing how they meet the standards set by public 
reason. 
The “Philosopher’s Brief” 
The moral and legal injunction to not kill another human being is arguably 
one of the oldest, if not the oldest prohibitions known to humankind. It is a well-
established doctrine in many major religions, philosophical treatises, but also in 
constitutional and civil law. Moral and legal exceptions which make killing 
permissible are rare, and the clearest ones are in cases of self-defense, or the 
defense of another – that is to say, in defense of life. If there are any candidates 
for a body of universal principles of morality, the injunction against killing will be 
among the strongest and most obvious. This is perhaps the reason why abortion 
and assisted suicide continue to evoke strong responses, even in places where 
such practices have been legalized. But while for cases of abortion there are 
disagreements as to whether the human life being terminated has full legal and 
moral status (and thus is of concern in the relevant respects), assisted suicide (at 
least of the legitimate kinds) is usually limited to persons who have full legal 
status. Therefore, the case of assisted suicide presents an especially interesting 
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case of a controversial issue on which an individual’s rights and autonomy are 
potentially at stake.  
Assisted suicide is to be distinguished from voluntary euthanasia106: for 
the latter, the patient is the one who undertakes the act of administering the lethal 
medication; for the former, the doctor by request of the patient is the one who 
administers the lethal medication.107 Assisted suicide is legal only in a handful of 
countries, and has an interesting and convoluted legal history, which I do not 
intend to discuss.108 Even though assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia have 
slightly different moral and legal considerations, they are similar in that four 
groups are involved: the state, individual citizens (some who are morally opposed 
to the legalization of said practices), terminally ill patients who wish to exercise 
the option to end their lives, and healthcare professionals who are supposed to aid 
them. I will comment on how I think these groups can come to engage each other 
in my conclusion. 
As previously discussed, the ideal of public reason is adhered to when 
citizens reason in terms of political values that are widely shared. My aim here is 
to discuss one such case made against the constitutional protection of assisted 
suicide. The possibility of making such a case should hopefully show that a 
permissive stance towards controversial issues like assisted suicide is not a 
                                                          
106 Voluntary euthanasia is further distinguished from non-voluntary euthanasia, which is by far a 
more controversial case, and involuntary euthanasia, deemed to be murder in most jurisdictions. 
See Robert Young, “Voluntary Euthanasia,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. 
Edward N. Zalta, Fall 2016 (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2016), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2016/entries/euthanasia-voluntary/. 
107 Gail Tulloch, Euthanasia - Choice and Death, 1 edition (Edinburgh University Press, 2005), 
33–34. 
108 See Young, “Voluntary Euthanasia”; Tulloch, Euthanasia - Choice and Death, 61–67. 
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forgone conclusion in public reasoning; rather, there can be compelling public 
reason arguments both for and against assisted suicide. I begin by providing a 
brief discussion of some important points of “The Philosophers’ Brief”. 
In 1997, Ronald Dworkin and 5 other philosophers (including Rawls) 
published an amicus curiae in relation to the pending U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions on whether dying patients have a right to choose death rather than 
continued pain and suffering.109 Then, in only one American state was it legal for 
doctors to prescribe lethal pills for patients who want to kill themselves.110 
According to Dworkin, The brief “defines a very general moral and constitutional 
principle – that every competent person has the right to make momentous 
personal decisions which invoke fundamental religious or philosophical 
convictions about life’s value for himself.” The brief further states that the legal 
cases in question “do not invite or require the Court to make moral, ethical, or 
religious judgments about how people should approach or confront their death or 
about when it is ethically appropriate to hasten one’s death or to ask others for 
help in doing so”, but “on the contrary, they ask the Court to recognize that 
individuals have a constitutionally protected interest in making those grave 
judgments for themselves, free from imposition of any religious or philosophical 
orthodoxy by court or legislature.”111 Further, the brief argues that “(d)enying the 
                                                          
109 Ronald Dworkin et al., “Assisted Suicide: The Philosophers’ Brief,” The New York Review of 
Books, accessed January 10, 2017, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/1997/03/27/assisted-suicide-
the-philosophers-brief/. 
110 In recent years, more U.S. states have legalized physician assisted suicide. See “New Mexico 
Court Strikes down Ruling That Allowed Assisted Suicide,” The Washington Times, accessed 
January 12, 2017, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/aug/11/assisted-suicide-new-
mexico-ruling-struck-higher-c/. 
111 Dworkin et al., “Assisted Suicide.” 
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opportunity to terminally ill patients who are in agonizing pain or otherwise 
doomed to an existence they regard as intolerable could only be justified on the 
basis of a religious or ethical conviction about the value or meaning of life 
itself.”112 
Part of the argument proceeds by analogy to a legal precedent set in 
Casey, that a state cannot constitutionally proscribe abortion in all cases as it 
protects a sphere of autonomy in which individuals must be permitted to make 
certain decisions for themselves. The Court “began its analysis by pointing out 
that [a]t the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, 
of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.” Choices that 
involve these are “central to personal dignity and autonomy”, and “are central to 
the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”113 Thus, according to the 
brief, to allow a total prohibition on abortion would be to permit a state to impose 
one conception of the meaning and value of human existence on all individuals. 
However, the brief concedes that “…patients in certain circumstances have a right 
that the state not forbid doctors to assist in their deaths, but they have no right to 
compel a doctor to assist them. The right in question, that is, is only a right to the 
help of a willing doctor.”114 
                                                          
112 Ibid. 
113 Ibid.: “If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official…can 
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or 
force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. A person’s interest in following his own 
convictions at the end of life is so central a part of the more general right to make ‘intimate and 
personal choices’ for himself that a failure to protect that particular interest would undermine the 




Throughout the brief, the concept and meaning of personal autonomy and 
liberty appealed to is an ordinary one, and we can add, a political value that is 
widely shared by all citizens regardless of their comprehensive commitments (and 
in the case of the U.S., it is protected by the American Constitution as 
fundamental). Personal autonomy as a political value requires no further 
philosophical or religious grounding, even though its limit still must be worked 
out in practice, in the better part through legislative arguments. A devout 
Christian and an atheist can both appreciate the value of personal autonomy: it is 
necessary to each so they can live their lives consistent with their moral 
convictions in a shared political context peacefully, as far as possible. Prima facie, 
the argument thus seems plausibly strong from the point of view of public 
reasoning, and if we accept the standpoint of public reason, have a good reason to 
tolerate the practice of assisted suicide should it be legalized. 
Weithman contra physician-assisted suicide 
It is the abovementioned claim that denying the right to physician-assisted 
suicide “could only be justified on the basis of a religious or ethical conviction” 
Paul Weithman takes issue with.115 Weithman argues that there are other 
justifications available which are consisted with the core claim of the brief’s 
constitutional argument, appealing to what Rawls calls “a balance of political 
values” that can be mutually accepted by reasonable citizens.116 In short, his 
position is that doctors should cultivate a virtue centered on an absolute 
                                                          





prohibition, that of acting from the intention of killing their patients.117 For 
Weithman, the reasons doctors should hold themselves to a prohibition on 
intentionally causing their patients’ deaths are “quite similar” to the reasons 
doctors should hold themselves to an absolute prohibition on seducing them, and 
these in great part have to do with fulfilling their professional responsibilities as 
physicians. One of a physician’s role-specific duties is to give good care to his/ 
her patients, and feelings that develop from a shared sexual experience can cloud 
his / her judgment and compromise this.118 Also, patients are in an asymmetrical 
power relationship with their doctors, and must make themselves vulnerable to 
their doctors to be diagnosed and properly treated. If they know that doctors have 
the intention to seduce them, they may be less forthcoming in these respects.119  
Weithman further argues for a blanket prohibition that leaves no room for 
exceptions or the exercise of case by case judgment, due to the potential for 
serious damage to the patient.120 He argues that “(r)ationalization and self-
deception are more effectively taken out of play by a stable commitment to refrain 
from actions of that kind under all circumstances…”121 Thus, the value of 
observing the absolute moral prohibition against having sexual relations with their 
patients: 
“derives from the importance of two distinct but related functions the 
prohibition plays in the practice of medicine. First…it enables physicians 
                                                          
117 Ibid., 554. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Ibid., 555. 
120 Ibid. 
121 Ibid., 556. 
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to cope with a potentially powerful temptation to have sex with their 
patients who may be incapable of genuine consent. Second, it grounds 
patients’ confidence that doctors will not accede to this temptation and 
exploit them if they place themselves in the vulnerable position they must 
assume if they are to receive the care they need.”122 
Weithman then argues that these considerations explain why the Hippocratic Oath 
included an absolute prohibition in the first place.123 The Oath is a professional 
oath, and one of its functions is to impose role-specific duties, and provide 
physicians with a special reason to honor them. As discussed, doctors are in a 
privileged position of power over their patients in their specific medical 
relationship, and it is particularly important that they do not abuse this position in 
ways that undermine their professional obligations.124 Also, swearing the Oath is 
a public act, and furnishes grounds for public trust in the medical profession, trust 
being necessary if patients are to turn to their doctors for treatment.125 For similar 
reasons, the prohibition against assisted suicide is to be absolute: because the 
consequences for making an error, even a honest mistake is potentially very 
grave, the corresponding need to protect patients and uphold their trust in the 
medical practice tells in favor of physicians holding themselves to an absolute 
moral prohibition.126 
                                                          
122 Ibid. 
123 See ibid., 565–66, for the significance of the oath. 
124 Ibid., 557. 
125 Ibid. 
126 Ibid., 561. 
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Weithman’s argument does not simply proceed from the moral wrongness 
of physician-assisted suicide, but from the potential harm to the “public interest 
reasonably conceived” that can arise from permitting it.127 The essence of 
Weithman’s arguments speaks to an individual’s interest (as well as society’s 
larger interest) in an effective healthcare system and the need to protect patients 
from harm. He argues that while the risks that doctors may make mistakes or 
succumb to temptation are not sufficient grounds for a categorical ban on 
physician-assisted suicide, the provision of adequate basic healthcare to all 
citizens is “a demand of basic justice”.128 Thus the state’s interest in making 
healthcare publicly available implies an interest in its making publicly available 
the reasons have to trust their doctors: 
“Publicly known legal prohibitions on physician-assisted suicide, like 
publicly known regulation of the quality of medical care, serve this state 
interest. This is because legalizing physician assisted suicide or according 
it constitutional protections would create the public perception that doctors 
act from the intention of causing the deaths of their patients and…would 
undermine public confidence in the medical profession.”129 
In conclusion, I want to note that in the full process of public debate and 
legislation a far more detailed analysis of these arguments must be undertaken, 
not to mention other relevant arguments that have not been raised. While my 
discussion hardly begins to do the authors justice in that respect, my primary 
                                                          
127 Ibid., 574. 
128 Ibid., 566. 
129 Ibid., 567. In fact, the argument is more complicated than this: compare 567-573. 
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intention was to highlight an example of arguing in terms of public reasons on the 
controversial issue of physician-assisted suicide.130 On this latter point, I hope I 
have made good. 
Conclusion 
I now return to the original question that motivated the discussions on 
public reason and physician-assisted suicide: ought citizens morally and legally 
tolerate controversial practices like physician-assisted suicide and abortion that 
they morally disagree with, and what possible reasons can we ground such 
toleration on? I argued that if we accept the ideal of public reason, we can have 
such grounds: certain controversial issues like abortion and physician-assisted 
suicide are matters of basic justice, and thus fall within the scope of public 
reasoning. In addition, given that in public reasoning, argumentation appeals to 
widely shared political values, we do have shared independent grounds on which 
we can begin to discuss and decide upon controversial issues. Dworkin and 
Weithman on the issue of physician-assisted suicide gave us some examples of 
what such shared interests and political values are: on the one hand, the state and 
individual citizens have a legitimate interest in protecting personal autonomy, and 
on the other, an interest to safeguard the integrity of and public trust in the 
practice of medicine. These values make no reference to comprehensive doctrines 
                                                          
130 Throughout the chapter, I have been considering the case of physician assisted suicide with 
physicians and their professional code as the main focus. Such an argument does not preclude the 
possibility of creating another profession that specializes in providing advice relevant to suicide, 
in the unlikely scenario that it become necessary from a legal and political standpoint to provide 
the option of assisted suicide, yet at the same time preserve the professional integrity of medicine. 
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of any sort, only to the political interests that concern society as a whole, and 
citizens individually. 
Of course, this does not mean that the citizen or society is required to tolerate just 
about anything, or that the decision in favor of physician-assisted suicide is a 
forgone conclusion: only for legitimate laws that are based on a consideration of a 
balance of public reasons does the requirement of toleration arise, if they do in 
fact go against one’s comprehensive beliefs. Citizens who are not legislators are 
not powerless in that they still have important roles to play in the public forum, 
debating, petitioning, and holding public officials accountable, even though they 
do not directly vote on laws. Thus, if physician-assisted suicide does become 
legitimate law, tolerating it is consistent with one’s holding the physician-assisted 
suicide to be morally wrong or mistaken. It has been noted by Rawls that having a 
legally protected right to do something does not mean that one is required to 
exercise that right, only that one abstain from forcefully preventing others from 
exercising their rights. Neither should the “losing” side think it an affront to their 
most fundamental beliefs, as public reasoning (and political liberalism) makes no 
claims on the truth of those beliefs. Rather, they have options that continue to be 
available to them, to convince others through persuasion or to challenge judicial 
decisions. 
Having described the situation from the point of view of the state and the 
citizen, what about physicians who are (hypothetically, if such a law is passed) 
legally permitted to assist in suicide? Recall that the liberal principle of legitimacy 
specifies that It is unfair (unreasonable) to impose through coercive force what 
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can be reasonably rejected; citizens owe each other a moral duty of fairness, 
specified in terms of mutual respect and reciprocity. While laws are backed by the 
coercive force of the state and opposing a legitimate law seems to be 
unreasonable, current laws permitting physician-assisted suicide do not require 
unwilling physicians to participate, in addition to having stringent requirements 
which must be met before assistance can be legally rendered.131 The situation is 
much the same with abortion, with many jurisdictions providing a clause for 
conscientious objection.132 It is recognized fairly widely that from the standpoint 
of the liberty of conscience, some weight must be given to the comprehensive 
moral convictions of individual doctors. In a similar way toleration, conceptually 
speaking, does not entail the duty to aid someone in a practice one has strong 
moral objections against. Thus, at the very least, toleration would be consistent 
with having the option of abstaining from such procedures, should they become 
within one’s professional purview. If assisted suicide and / or voluntary 
euthanasia is to be legalized, then at an institutional level there ought to be 
sufficient provisions for such options to be utilized. But the individual physician 
ought not be compelled to provide such a service as part of his professional 
obligations, as it violates his liberty of conscience. 
In this chapter I have discussed controversial issues of a moral nature. 
This is not to say that the only possible issues on which there is reasonable 
disagreement are moral ones; one can imagine citizens disagreeing on a whole 
                                                          
131 Tulloch, Euthanasia - Choice and Death, 65–66. 
132 See Singapore Statutes, Termination of Pregnancy Act, Chapter 324, 6(1)-(2) 
66 
 
host of issues, like the budget, social welfare, education and so on. Rather, the 
hope is that on issues where there is especially strong and intractable moral 
disagreement, we are not condemned to an impasse, nor the imposition of one 





4. Hampton, Shklar, and political liberalism 
Introduction 
Eventually we want to ask whether the fact of reasonable pluralism is a 
historical fate we should lament. To show that it is not, or that it has its 
very considerable benefits, would be to reconcile us in part to our 
condition.133 
Liberals are sometimes perceived to be among other things weak-minded 
relativists, and irredeemably hopeful about human beings. They are weak minded, 
it is claimed, because the toleration that is characteristic of liberalism is unable to 
pronounce judgments on the morality of public and private conduct, for fear of 
violating its own neutrality. In addition, the permissiveness which accompanies a 
liberal society presupposes and / or entails relativism, a state of affairs in which 
every moral position is as good as any other, or at worst, no objective assessment 
can be made about their relative validity and merit. Furthermore, actual social life 
and human history has shown that human affairs can quickly degenerate from 
civilization to chaos. Even within civilized and peaceful societies, the 
preponderance of law-abiding citizens and the rule of law is threatened to the 
extent that there exist a significant number who refuse to honor such laws, except 
only as a pretense. This is something liberals must recognize, and it is said that 
their maintenance of toleration and their expectation of mutual respect between 
citizens in light of such circumstances is something of a pipe dream. 
                                                          
133 John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, ed. Erin Kelly, 2nd edition (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Belknap Press, 2001), 5. 
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Given the prima facie desirability of toleration, how are we then to ground 
it, given that moral and religious pluralism endures in society? If there are a range 
of arguments for toleration, which one (and which conception of toleration) would 
be most suitably addressed to citizens of a liberal democratic society? For Rawls, 
the desiderata for such arguments are that they cannot rest on the creedal 
acceptance of particular comprehensive doctrines, whether religious or 
philosophical. If they are, they will be unconvincing to the great majority of 
people that such arguments are addressed to, those who hold reasonable but non-
liberal comprehensive doctrines. Furthermore, it would be unfair and illegitimate, 
from the standpoint of political liberalism, as it would mean having them accept 
as a basis of political society principles that cannot be reasonably justified to 
them, failing to uphold the “liberal principle of legitimacy”. 
A second consideration is that modus vivendi type arguments which are 
ultimately reducible to considerations of mutual advantage are unsuitable, for if 
they are the only grounds for toleration, then the society which they inform will 
not be sufficiently stable; should the balance of interests and power shift 
significantly, toleration may quickly lapse and it may no longer make sense for 
the now more powerful group to tolerate the weaker one. Whereas principled 
arguments that are comprehensive in nature may be overly sectarian and have 
limited appeal to all but comprehensive liberals, pragmatic modus vivendi type 
arguments will lose their appeal for the stronger party if the balance of power 
shifts in their favor. Thus Rawls would have achieved something quite significant 
if his argument for toleration avoids the Scylla and Charybdis as specified; that is, 
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if it is both sufficiently “thin”, and not merely pragmatic. I have attempted to 
argue in Chapter 2 that an argument from the burdens of judgment appealing to, 
among other elements, the identity of a citizen and mutual respect meets these 
requirements. I then tried to show the shape that such toleration can take, citing 
the specific case of controversial laws regarding abortion and physician-assisted 
suicide. My argument amounts to the claim that citizens, regardless of their more 
specific views concerning religious and / or moral truth (or its impossibility), have 
a principled reason to tolerate others’ views, behavior, and the practices one 
sincerely believes to be morally wrong and mistaken. 
As individuals, we may not think that a particular law is congruent with 
our deepest moral beliefs. One such example which continues to divide many is 
the moral permissibility of first trimester abortion, which many are divided on. 
But whatever our more particular views on abortion, euthanasia, and a whole host 
of other issues of moral significance, citizens have an institutional identity and 
relate to each other according to publicly accepted and affirmed norms. Thus to 
not have one’s views about the good enshrined in the form of a coercive law does 
not make the law less deserving of respect, and certainly does not undermine our 
relationships with each other as citizens. The sense in which we respect others and 
public legislation is not a positive appraisal of another’s views or way of life, but 
is based on reciprocity and mutual respect of each other as citizens. Conversely, 
the use of coercive force to intervene with the lives of others when there are no 
legitimate reasons to do so violates mutual respect.  
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Religious organizations on the other hand, may have good reasons (from its 
doctrinal standpoint, as well as for reasons of unity and survival) to not tolerate 
certain kinds of conduct, for instance the expression of heretical beliefs within its 
membership. They may deem that certain members should be excommunicated or 
that certain kinds of teaching ought to be suppressed, and it would not be 
illegitimate for them to do so. But excommunicated former members ought not 
for that reason become social and political outcasts; they continue to participate in 
the greater social world.134 It follows that the limits of toleration would be drawn 
with respect to what can be justified in terms of the general interests of such 
persons, some of which include the necessary conditions for survival and personal 
security. 
For many, such a way of conceiving toleration is fraught with difficulties. 
Some critics of Rawls express doubts that the methodology of political liberalism 
is truly “political”. One such critic charges Rawls of having smuggled Christian 
premises in his conception of a person and the political good.135 If this is the case, 
then toleration procured by way of political liberalism would prove to depend on 
at least a partially-comprehensive doctrine, thus proving controversial. Other 
critics seize upon Rawls’ usage of the concept of “reasonableness”, remarking 
                                                          
134 See John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 31: 
“…we refer to a profound and pervasive shift, or reversal, in our final ends and commitments; we 
refer to our different moral (which includes our religious) identity. On the road to Damascus Saul 
of Tarsus becomes Paul the Apostle. Yet such a conversion implies no change in our public or 
institutional identity….”  
135 David H. McIlroy, “Locke and Rawls on Religious Toleration and Public Reason,” Oxford 
Journal of Law and Religion 2, no. 1 (April 1, 2013): 21–22. 
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that it has illiberal undertones.136 Furthermore, if reasonableness, understood as 
the willingness and ability to offer and abide by fair terms of social cooperation is 
reducible to merely considerations of self-interest, does this not shift the weight 
greatly in favor of a modus vivendi conception? In fact, Rawls says remarkably 
little by way of arguing for such an important part of his philosophy. However, 
Rawls himself shows that he is not unaware of these worries when he comments 
on the distinction he makes between the reasonable and the rational:  
“It may not be possible to prove that the reasonable cannot be derived 
from the rational. A negative statement of this kind is simply a conjecture. 
The best one may be able to do is to show that the serious attempts 
(Gauthier’s is an example) to derive the reasonable from the rational do 
not succeed, and so far as they appear to succeed, they rely at some point 
on conditions expressing the reasonable itself. If sound, these remarks 
suggest that in philosophy questions at the most fundamental level are 
not usually settled by conclusive argument. What is obvious to some 
persons and accepted as a basic idea is unintelligible to others. The 
way to resolve the matter is to consider after due reflection which 
view, when fully worked out, offers the most coherent and convincing 
account. About this, of course, judgments may differ.”137 (emphasis mine) 
                                                          
136 Jean Hampton, “The Common Faith of Liberalism,” in The Intrinsic Worth of Persons: 
Contractarianism in Moral and Political Philosophy, ed. Daniel Farnham, 1 edition (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), 176–79. 
137 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 53. 
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The main point of this chapter is to address some of these concerns. I argue that 
the Rawlsian conception of toleration can be shown to be i) suitably “political” 
and not necessarily “comprehensive”, ii) a substantive liberal conception (and not 
purely formal, nor relativistic or skeptical), iv) principled and not a mere modus 
vivendi. 
Is Rawlsian toleration too good to be true? 
One critic who has expressed some of the worries highlighted is Jean 
Hampton. In The Common Faith of Liberalism, Hampton argues that Rawls 
rejects what she terms “enlightenment liberalism”, the idea “that reason can yield 
a true comprehensive (and secular) conception of justice that can bind a pluralist 
society”, and provide a just and stable foundation for its political life.138 The 
transition from the “comprehensive” liberalism of A Theory of Justice to a strictly 
“political” liberalism was motivated by Rawls’ acknowledgement that his own 
earlier attempt to ground political society on a single comprehensive conception 
of liberalism could be just as “sectarian” as doing so on a comprehensive religious 
doctrine. If founded on a comprehensive conception, the acceptance of toleration 
and other familiar liberal principles may violate the very principles which they 
insist on. Furthermore, as previously discussed, Rawls does not believe that the 
conscientious, sincere, and correct exercise of human reason will lead to 
convergence on a single set of answers regarding the ultimate good (the most 
choice-worthy life, whether there exists a God and what that entails etc.). In fact, 
                                                          
138 Hampton, “The Common Faith of Liberalism,” 151–53. 
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the opposite seems to be true: what he calls the “fact of reasonable pluralism”, 
accounted for by the burdens of judgment. For this reason, Rawls eschews 
metaphysics and pursues a “method of avoidance” regarding the truth of such 
doctrines. 
Hampton does not believe that Rawls’ political liberalism ultimately 
succeeds in formulating a liberalism that is genuinely non-sectarian and non-
comprehensive. More significantly, she argues that there is no “third way” 
between prudential and comprehensive arguments for liberalism (and by 
implication, toleration). Thus, Rawls is compelled to choose between them: 
…If…Rawls rejects a conception of political stability that is based on a 
politically expedient (and likely temporary) consensus, he must endorse a 
conception of liberalism little different from the Enlightenment liberalism 
he claims to reject.139 
The title of her article is indicative of her main argument: that there is a common 
core of concepts which are shared by various seemingly disparate liberal theorists 
including Rawls, despite their different conceptions of liberalism. For instance, 
the cardinal concepts of “freedom” and “equality” can be interpreted and fleshed 
out in many particular ways, even as they are contained within all liberal theories. 
Hampton’s argument turns on one of these general tenets, the “common faith” in 
reason that all “enlightenment liberals” supposedly share: 
                                                          
139 Ibid., 153. 
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Reason is the tool by which the liberal state governs. Whatever the 
religious, moral, or metaphysical views of the people, they are expected to 
deal with one another in the political arena through rational argument 
and reasonable attitudes, and the legitimating arguments directing at 
individuals in order to procure their consent must be based on reason.140  
Hampton claims that “all liberals have been committed to the Enlightenment idea 
that human beings have the rational capacity to grasp the nature of the world – not 
just the physical world, but the moral and social world whose truths a legitimate 
society must respect.”141 It is worth noting this is not the decidedly controversial 
view that reason is superior to religious belief or revelation, but that there is a 
“normal faculty of reasoning” common to all that suffices for working out how 
political society ought to be structured, regardless of our particular religious 
beliefs.142  
Hampton points out that there are many other liberals who like Rawls take 
care not to embed their concepts (for example “freedom”) within a larger theory 
of morality, one of whom is Joel Feinberg.143 Thus Rawls’ claim that his political 
liberalism is “freestanding” does not appear to be as unique as it seems. If Rawls, 
like Feinberg, “still proceeds by way of philosophical argumentation and the 
                                                          
140 Ibid., 159. 
141 Ibid., 160. 
142 Ibid. 
143 Ibid., 164. See Hampton’s quotation from Feinberg’s The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law: 
“…But I make no effort to derive some of these responses from the others, or to rank them in 
terms of their degree of basicness…I do not believe that such an approach is precluded, but only 
that it is unnecessary. Progress on penultimate questions need not wait for solutions to the ultimate 
ones.” Compare John Rawls, “The Independence of Moral Theory,” in Collected Papers, ed. 
Samuel Freeman, Revised ed. edition (Harvard University Press, 2001). 
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search for moral truth”, then does his political liberalism manage to avoid the 
pitfalls of all other hitherto attempts? Hampton raises the following possible 
reply, only to quickly reject it: that Rawls appeals to particular conceptions of 
freedom and equality as ideas which are accepted in modern democratic 
regimes.144 Indeed, this is similar in spirit to Rawls’ multiple mentions of a 
“shared fund of ideas” implicit within the public political culture of a liberal 
democracy, ideas that can be used as fixed points of an account of political 
liberalism.145 However, Hampton thinks that Rawls must (and has) rejected this 
for two reasons. Firstly, she claims, even if it were true that everyone in these 
regimes happened to accept the Rawlsian understanding of these ideals, assuming 
them because they happen to be accepted is no way to generate a theory of justice 
for a pluralist society. Such a foundation makes the ideals a mere modus vivendi, 
“a politically convenient starting point in our time” (and one may add, particular 
place), but is inappropriate for other political societies, and perhaps also for ours 
in years to come when different ideals hold sway.146 Next, according to Hampton 
it is “strikingly implausible” to claim that the specifically Rawlsian conceptions 
of freedom and equality are commonly accepted in these regimes. Rawls 
interprets and develops the said concepts into a particular conception, but this 
supposedly fixes them in such a way that certain persuasions will not be able to 
accept, Hobbesians cited as a case in point.147 Rawls’ minimalist and supposedly 
                                                          
144 Hampton, The Common Faith of Liberalism, 164. 
145 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 8, 100–101. 
146 Hampton, “The Common Faith of Liberalism,” 165; Jean Hampton, “Should Political 
Philosophy Be Done Without Metaphysics?,” Ethics 99, no. 4 (1989): 803. 
147 Hampton, “The Common Faith of Liberalism,” 165–66: “…it is a conception that makes 
reference to ‘moral powers,’ it presupposes a certain understanding of human beings, and is at 
least a minimal theory of human agency. Those who take issue with the idea that we have both 
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non-metaphysical methodology thus requires the same (though unavoidable) step 
of commitment to certain positions in “non-political moral and philosophical 
issues”, making his political liberalism no different from traditional accounts of 
liberalism.148 There is no way to do political philosophy but to develop general 
concepts into particular conceptions, and doing so involves fixing certain 
presuppositions about human beings, however minimal they are. 
Most importantly, the argument from the burdens of judgment is evidence 
that Rawls relies on the enlightenment notion of reason after all. According to 
Hampton, Rawls continually talks as if there is a “fact of the matter” about 
reasonableness, and that the burdens of judgment and the reasonable disagreement 
it implies are facts that all reasonable persons must recognize. While reasonable 
people can (and probably will) conclude differently regarding the truth of ultimate 
matters, the burdens of judgment seems to be an exception they can all converge 
on. Thus toleration is not something that people in contemporary societies just 
happen to think right, nor the product of societal consensus, but is supposed to be 
the conclusion “…of a bit of reasoning that Rawls believes is undeniable”.149 
Hence Rawls, by employing an argument from the burdens of judgment is 
expressing a commitment to this “faith”. While Rawls seems to be arguing in a 
“political” rather than “comprehensive” manner, the argument from the burdens 
of judgment show that he is still relying on reason (qua enlightenment liberalism) 
                                                          
these moral powers will take issue with Rawls’ conception of freedom. For example, Hobbesians 
will likely reject it, given that it presupposes people have a “capacity for a sense of justice” of the 
sort that Hobbes explicitly denies that any of us has.” 
148 Ibid., 167. 
149 Ibid., 173. 
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to yield moral truth. Thus Rawls must also admit that there are good and bad ways 
of reasoning, as shown by his rejection of certain sources of (unreasonable) 
disagreement.150  
Hampton’s critique of Rawls’ political liberalism and its associated 
methodology is detailed and complex, and in order to avoid not being able to do 
justice to her full argument, I choose to respond to three of her objections that I 
take to be salient. Firstly, Hampton is certainly right in saying that Rawls must 
reject all modus vivendi strategies in formulating his conception of liberalism that 
he hopes will be stable “for the right reasons”, modus vivendi strategies being 
“…merely politically expedient, temporary, and contingent”.151 And while it is 
correct that simply because people happen to accept certain ideas do not ipso 
facto generate a theory of justice, whether such a theory is liberal or not, it is 
wrong to say that such a starting point can only yield a mere modus vivendi. 
Whether the basis of toleration in a society is a mere modus vivendi or something 
more permanent and stable depends on the existence of a principled account of 
toleration (or political conception of justice) that all citizens have good reasons to 
accept, independent of their comprehensive moral convictions.  
                                                          
150 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 55.: “…There are of course various explanations (of why 
conscientious attempt to reason with one another does not lead to reasonable agreement). We 
might suppose, say, that most people hold views that advance their own more narrow interests; 
and since their interests are different, so are their views. Or perhaps people are often irrational and 
not very bright, and this mixed with logical errors leads to conflicting opinions. But while such 
explanations explain much, they are too easy and not the kind we want.” 
151 Hampton, “The Common Faith of Liberalism,” 165. 
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In fact, one can move further by saying that political philosophy can only 
begin productively with ideas and ideals that are held in common.152 That political 
liberalism, or a liberal account of toleration cannot be fully persuasive to say, 
Fascists, just because we do not share the same political society along with its 
fund of ideas, is not a weakness of the theory per se. It can be said that Rawls’ 
political liberalism is addressed to a specific audience, the citizens of a 
functioning and relatively stable and peaceful liberal democracy.153 In addition, 
political liberalism may still have something to say to non-liberal regimes in 
presenting an attractive, coherent understanding of what a society can hope to 
look, stable and united by a shared understanding of the public good. Also, it is 
not only imaginable but highly probable that a large majority of citizens within an 
actual liberal democratic society hold partially developed and incompletely 
understood notions like freedom and equality, concepts that can even be said to be 
shared by other illiberal political ideologies (like Fascism and Communism), and 
even their own reasonable comprehensive doctrines. The meaning and limits of 
such notions in actual political practice can perhaps be clarified by political 
philosophy, and I will elaborate on this in the next chapter. 
Secondly, we can agree with Hampton that Rawls does in fact develop a 
particular conception of liberalism, and even his “political” liberalism requires at 
the very minimum, a decision on some potentially (but not necessarily) 
                                                          
152 See Dreben, Burton, “On Rawls and Political Liberalism,” in The Cambridge Companion to 
Rawls, ed. Samuel Freeman (Cambridge, U.K.; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 
322–23. 
153 See Jonathan Quong, Liberalism without Perfection, 1 edition (Oxford; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 138–39. Compare John Rawls, Lectures on the History of Political 
Philosophy, ed. Samuel Freeman, First Edition (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press, 2007), 1. 
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controversial fixed points, like the possibility and nature of human agency and 
whether or not human beings have a normally functioning sense of justice, issues 
that a thinker like Hobbes will certainly dispute. Now it goes without saying that a 
Hobbesian will have fundamental disagreements with any liberalism based on a 
comprehensive account that is mutually exclusive with its own claims. But I think 
Rawls will reply, the way he wishes to be judged is by considering whether his 
exposition as a whole yields an attractive account of political justice154, not 
simply by disputing his starting assumptions. An assessment of this nature is 
beyond the scope of my project; however if we agree with Rawls that this is the 
right way of judging his project, I believe many today will find assumptions of 
Hobbes’ philosophy (e.g. his skepticism and materialism), not to mention the 
conclusion it leads to (monarchy) less attractive when judged as a whole. It is not 
clear that the burden of proof is squarely on the Rawlsian liberal when it comes to 
both bedrock assumptions, and defending the attractiveness of a liberal view 
considered as a whole. A brief reply to the Hobbesian will be attempted later, but 
for the moment I want to pursue a slightly different question: given the minimal 
notion of reason that liberals (Hampton included) supposedly affirm, can we 
arrive at something close to a consensus on at least some of the concepts, 
conceptions, and conclusions that underlie political life, assuming a certain shared 
history and society? The historical example of Christianity is evidence that such 
                                                          
154 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 5n5: “The exposition of justice as fairness starts with these familiar 
ideas….But because the exposition begins with these ideas does not mean that the argument for 
justice as fairness simply assumes them as a basis. Everything depends on how the exposition 
works our as a whole and whether the ideas and principles of this conception of justice, as well as 
its conclusions, prove acceptable on due reflection.” 
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consensus is in principle possible. While Christian thinkers like Luther and Calvin 
have sometimes expressed intolerant views and acted in intolerant ways, there are 
a whole host of post-reformation Christian thinkers who have views that are 
compatible with and supportive of religious toleration, among them Locke and 
Bayle.155  
Thirdly, the supposed problem of Rawls’ reliance on reason seems to be 
overstated. Hampton speaks favorably of Rawls’ notion of public reason, but is 
not content with his avoidance of the notion of “truth”. Rawls, as charged, is a 
philosopher engaging in a philosophical project, and philosophy implies the use of 
reason (in the ordinary sense stated above). Hampton, as a philosopher, is 
understandably uncomfortable about Rawls' lack of employment of the concept of 
truth. But Rawls need not eschew the ordinary employment of reason, and I think 
his conception of liberalism (and toleration) has considerable merits as compared 
to traditional liberal accounts. While a Rawlsian account of toleration may have 
very little to say to someone who is incapable or unwilling to engage in reasoning 
and discourse in the ordinary sense, it is fair to say that such a bar is low and can 
be met by most (if not nearly all) normally functioning citizens. The assumption 
that human beings are capable of engaging with each other in this manner seems 
to be a necessary condition of ordinary social and political life, not just in liberal 
regimes. It does however, take on special significance in the social life of a liberal 
democracy with its emphasis on public deliberation and justification. 
                                                          
155 See Rainer Forst, Toleration in Conflict: Past and Present (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013), 208–65. 
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Hampton’s stronger objection targets the burdens of judgment. According 
to her, there are some suppressed steps in the argument from the burdens of 
judgment that when scrutinized, make the argument little different from 
traditional liberal defenses of political toleration.156 Thus Hampton lists three 
ways to make the connection between the fact of reasonable disagreement and 
toleration: 1) the fact of reasonable disagreement shows that morality is 
complicated, and some moral theories grasp some aspects of it better than others, 
thus political society must allow many views in order that the full extent of 
morality can be pursued and understood, 2) the fact of reasonable disagreement 
means we must be epistemically humble, and hence refrain from suppressing 
views we cannot be sure are not right, and 3) the fact of reasonable disagreement 
is intrinsically good because it is a sign of a society of individuals reasoning 
independently and freely.157 If Rawls relies on any of these three ways of 
clarifying the connection between the burdens of judgment and toleration, then 
the objection goes, he offers nothing really novel. But does he have to? 
I believe that while all three ways of making the connection are 
compatible with Rawls’ argument, he need not necessarily rely on any one. As 
previously argued, concepts implicit in the public political culture of a society like 
mutual respect and reciprocity can be ways of identifying a shared starting point. 
Crucially, such concepts are connected to, but need not refer to comprehensive 
doctrines, even liberal ones. Thus, saying that concepts like equality and freedom 
                                                          
156 Hampton, “The Common Faith of Liberalism,” 174. 
157 Ibid.: Hampton attributes these to Timothy Jackson (see n25). 
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has its roots in Christianity does not for that reason disqualify them as candidates 
for suitable political values, if it can be shown that they have independent 
validity. One way of doing this is to show that citizens already do have such 
notions, and they are publicly acknowledged regardless of the individual citizen’s 
privately held comprehensive doctrine. To the extent that such an attempt is 
successful, Rawls does have a novel and important contribution to make: his 
innovation is not in coming up with an entirely brand new conception of liberal 
justice or values, but attempting to distill them into a minimal political account 
that can appeal to all (at least potentially). So long as particular conceptions 
affirm the same general principles (including toleration), political liberalism need 
not pass judgment on how they are arrived at within a comprehensive doctrine, 
whether from certain lines or argument or bedrock principles. Also, it is important 
to note that the burdens of judgment as identified by Rawls are not to be further 
justified with reference to a doctrine that is more basic, even though it bears great 
resemblance to a kind of epistemological fallibilism.158 It is easy to see how this 
would be unacceptable, given that there can be reasonable disagreement on this 
matter. Rather, it is not far-fetched to see that the burdens of judgment can be 
arrived at by reflecting upon the functioning of ordinary human reason. If this is 
the case, then accepting them will similarly be relatively uncontroversial. 
Needless to say, it would be desirable that liberalism can provide a 
principled reply to Hobbesians regarding the basis for toleration on terms they 
could not reasonably reject, but it may not be possible to do so, at least not one 
                                                          
158 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 62. 
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that is consistent with their metaphysics. But this does not mean that no answer 
can be given that can satisfy them on some of their own terms, and it may be 
sufficient for liberals that Hobbesians, should they exist in political society, are 
willing to tolerate others for whatever reasons they find to be compelling ones. It 
may be less important that one believes, along with Hobbes, that human beings 
are incapable of a sense of justice, than that one ought to act in a just manner in 
social life. 
The basis of toleration in The Liberalism of Fear 
While some conceptions of liberalism have comparatively deep and 
comprehensive groundings, considerations of certain human concerns that are less 
deep and more broadly shared can in fact yield similar conclusions. One such 
attempt at an ecumenical and “political” liberalism is made by Judith Shklar in 
her influential essay The Liberalism of Fear. For Shklar, liberalism refers to a 
political doctrine159 with one overriding aim: to secure the political conditions that 
are necessary for the exercise of personal freedom. The original and only 
defensible meaning for liberalism is that:  
“Every adult should be able to make as many effective decisions without 
fear or favor about as many aspects of her or his life as is compatible with 
the like freedom of every adult…It is a political notion, because the fear 
                                                          
159 Shklar’s use of “doctrine” differs from Rawls’, although it is very much similar in spirit to 
Rawls’ notion of a “political conception”. 
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and favor that have always inhibited freedom are overwhelmingly 
generated by governments…”160 (emphasis mine) 
While there are many sources of social oppression, “none has the deadly effect of 
those who, as agents of the modern state, have unique resources of physical might 
and persuasion at their disposal.” Shklar observes that liberalism thus understood 
has been “very rare both in theory and practice in the last two hundred odd 
years”.161 Like Rawls, Shklar repeatedly emphasizes that liberalism does not have 
to depend on specific religious or philosophical systems of thought, and does not 
have to choose among them, so long as they do not reject toleration.162 It is “not 
necessarily linked to any one religious or scientific doctrine, though it is 
psychologically more compatible with some rather than others.” Atheism, 
agnosticism, relativism and nihilism are not logically entailed by the acceptance 
of political liberalism, but may be psychologically compatible with it.163 
However, it must only reject those doctrines that do not acknowledge a distinction 
between the personal and the public.164 The version of liberalism that Shklar 
favors (“the liberalism of fear”) draws heavily on “a strongly developed historical 
                                                          
160 Judith N. Shklar, “The Liberalism of Fear,” in Liberalism and the Moral Life, ed. Nancy L. 
Rosenblum (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991), 21. 
161 Ibid., 22. “…let us not forget that the United States was not a liberal state until after the Civil 
War, even then often in name only. In short, to speak of a liberal era is not to refer to anything that 
actually happened, except possibly by comparison to what came after 1914.” 
162 Ibid., 24, 26, 30. 
163 It is worth noting that atheism, agnosticism and nihilism can be compatible with extremely 
illiberal or authoritarian doctrines as well – some varieties of Communism practiced in the 20th 
century come to mind. Neither do the above religious and moral positions necessarily entail 
political liberalism, and vice versa. See Ibid., 25: “A society governed by extremely oppressive 
skeptics can be easily imagined if, for example, they were to follow Nietzsche’s political notions 
energetically. That is also true of the natural sciences…it is not impossible to imagine a science 
friendly dictatorship.” 
164 There is an important analogy (or perhaps intellectual precedence) in the separation of church 
and society, or church and state in the Christian context. Leonard Verduin and Franklin H. Littell, 
The Reformers and Their Stepchildren (Paris, Ark.: The Baptist Standard Bearer, 2001), 38–39. 
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memory”, a memory of the brutality of torture and horrors of war, rather than the 
possibilities of intellectual and moral progress. It is concerned with the 
asymmetry of power between the military, police, and government, and on the 
other side, individuals. The recognition of the asymmetry of power between the 
individual citizen and the state, the potential for abuse, and the need to protect the 
weak are thus the main concerns for the liberalism of fear: 
“Given the inevitability of that inequality of military, police, and 
persuasive power which is called government, there is evidently always 
much to be afraid of. And one may, thus, be less inclined to celebrate the 
blessings of liberty than to consider the dangers of tyranny and war that 
threaten it. For this liberalism the basic units of political life are not 
discursive and reflecting persons, nor friends and enemies, nor patriotic 
soldier citizens, nor energetic litigants, but the weak and the powerful.”165 
The particular kind of freedom that it hopes to secure is the freedom from abuse 
of power and intimidation of the defenseless.166 For Shklar, the assumption amply 
justified by political history is that some agents of the government will behave 
lawlessly and brutally most of the time unless they are prevented from doing 
so.167 In addition, the liberalism of fear does not offer a summum bonum toward 
which all political agents should strive, but begins with a summum malum that all 
would avoid if they could, the evil of cruelty and the fear it inspires.168 It is 
                                                          
165 Shklar, “The Liberalism of Fear,” 25. 
166 Ibid., 27. 
167 Ibid., 28. 
168 Ibid., 29: “To that extent the liberalism of fear makes a universal and especially a cosmopolitan 
claim, as it historically always has done….”  
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focused on cruelty not as a person inclination, but that which results from the 
differences in public power, and systematic fear which makes freedom 
impossible, not the healthy fear of avoidable pain. However, Shklar herself 
acknowledges that “putting cruelty first” is an insufficient basis for political 
liberalism169, but merely a starting point. What is necessary is to move from an 
intuition that has immediate psychological appeal to something that can be a 
principle of political morality, and one way this can be achieved is by: 
“…asking whether the prohibition would benefit the vast majority of 
human beings in meeting their known needs and wants. Kantians and a 
utilitarian could accept one of these tests, and liberalism need not choose 
between them.”170 
Whether or not we agree that the test just mentioned will in fact be fully 
acceptable to Kantians and Utilitarians (also, people of many other moral and 
religious persuasions), it seems that avoiding the evils mentioned by Shklar are at 
least a necessary condition of any kind of life minimally worth living. One 
example is instructive, what Shklar calls “the most reliable test”: to know whether 
a cruelty is to be endured or not, one is to ask the likeliest victims, the least 
powerful persons, under controlled conditions.171 At the very least, if a series of 
such questions can be answered in the affirmative by citizens of different 
                                                          
169 See Judith N. Shklar, “Putting Cruelty First,” Daedalus 111, no. 3 (1982): 17–27: I am unable 
to discuss this very complex issue here, but Shklar’s point is that for Christians (not to mention 
other groups), cruelty is not the worst of sins: different groups may have a differing 
comprehensive moralities which rank cruelty lower. 
170 Shklar, “The Liberalism of Fear,” 30. 
171 Ibid., 35. 
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comprehensive beliefs, then an important step has been taken in the direction of a 
shared political point of view. It seems to be the case that the minimal 
assumptions of liberals concerning human nature (for political purposes) need not 
be wholly unacceptable to people with strong convictions on the subject. This is 
achieved by focusing on certain observable social facts that are politically 
relevant172: 
“For political purposes liberalism does not have to assume anything about 
human nature except that people, apart from similar physical and 
psychological structures, differ in their personalities to a very marked 
degree....some people will be encumbered with group traditions they 
cherish, while others may only want to escape (from them)…These 
socially very important aspects of human experience are…extremely 
diverse and subject to change. Social learning is a great part of our 
character, though the sum of all our roles may not add up to a complete 
“self”. For political purposes it is not this irreducible “self” or the 
peculiar character that we acquire in the course of our education that 
matter, but only the fact that many different “selves” should be free to 
interact politically.”173 (emphasis mine) 
It is noteworthy, perhaps even crucial that Shklar repeats the following point 
which shows a certain kinship to Rawls’ political liberalism: that liberalism does 
                                                          
172 Of course the selection and interpretation of those facts, and whether such a state of affairs is to 
be lamented or not cannot be made fully persuasive to absolutely everyone; nonetheless, this is not 
a significant weakness. 
173 Shklar, “The Liberalism of Fear,” 35. 
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not have to depend on specific religious or philosophical systems of thought, and 
it does not have to choose among them so long as they do not reject toleration.174 
Shklar rejects “relativists” who claim that the liberalism of fear judges inherited 
standards by alien standards that are purported to be universal, and thus “an 
arrogant imposition of false as well as partial principles.”175 Against the latter, she 
argues that even people of a very different culture have similar concerns regarding 
cruelty and a minimally secure life.176  
But perhaps some critics will accuse her of falling back into the same trap 
as Rawls and others when she says the following: “Only the challenge from 
nowhere and the claims of universal humanity and rational argument cast in 
general terms can be put to the test of general scrutiny and public criticism.”177 In 
stating her case in this way, would she have presupposed a point of view that is 
more involved than is desirable, as it may imply a privileging of reason over 
tradition? Although we cannot speak for Shklar, I believe her argument as a whole 
can be understood in such a way that is defensible from the standpoint of 
Rawlsian toleration. A case in point is the notion of fear she relies on to make her 
                                                          
174 Ibid., 24: “…the liberalism of fear as a strictly political theory is not necessarily linked to any 
one religious or scientific doctrine, though it is psychologically more compatible with some 
rather than with others. It must reject only those political doctrines that do not recognize any 
difference between spheres of the personal and the public.” Again on 25: “The liberalism of fear is 
thus not necessarily tied to either skepticism or to the pursuit of the natural sciences….”, cf. 
ibid. the less sanguine “…a society of believers who choose never to resort to the use of the 
agencies of government to further their faith is imaginable, though not usual.”; ”A society 
governed by extremely oppressive skeptics can be easily imagined if, for example, they were to 
follow Nietzsche’s political notions energetically….” Also 26: “Liberalism need not decide 
among traditions that are not hostile to its aspirations, nor does it have to regard the claims 
of any traditions inherently false, simply because it does not meet scientific standards or rational 
proof.” (emphases mine) 
175 Ibid., 34. 
176 Ibid. “The Chinese did not really like Mao’s reign any more than we would, in spite of their 




case: it is not a metaphysical fear of the unknown that forms the bedrock of 
Hobbes’ philosophy178, but something widely acknowledged to be an evil, if not 
an exclusive, then at least an especially salient concern for citizens living in a 
modern state. Such a notion of fear is easily understood and its significance can 
be appreciated, independent of liberal or non-liberal comprehensive doctrines. 
Thus Shklar’s strategy, like Rawls’ political liberalism, yields an attractive, 
principled argument for toleration and its limits. The crux once again lies in 
identifying and working from publicly acknowledged shared values to arrive at a 
conception of toleration through ordinary human reason. 
Conclusion 
Liberals like Shklar and Rawls can thus respond in the following manner 
to the concerns raised at the beginning of this chapter: as shown, liberalism is not 
based on relativism or skepticism, but on a set of widely shared substantive 
political values. Because of this it can yield a principled account of toleration, and 
not a mere modus vivendi. These substantive political values (examples 
previously discussed include mutual respect and reciprocity) can be specified 
independently of comprehensive doctrines, they can in principle be acceptable to 
citizens with a broad range of religious and philosophical convictions, some of 
which are mutually incompatible. Rawls thus looks to the public political culture 
of a liberal democracy for this independent basis, in which such ideas already 
exist in a nascent form, and to a good extent regulate the relations between 
                                                          
178 See Jan H. Blits, “Hobbesian Fear,” Political Theory 17, no. 3 (1989): 417–31. 
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citizens. Furthermore, these substantive political values will be strengthened to 
the extent that they can be supported from within a citizen’s own comprehensive 
conception of the good. A conception of liberal toleration in the Rawlsian spirit is 
not irredeemably hopeful but cautiously optimistic, appealing to common ground 
in light of reasonable disagreement regarding the good, while garnering support 
from doctrines that are potentially in conflict with each other. Against Hampton, 
Rawls’ general methodology and his employment of reason is not unacceptable 
but ordinary, and does have comparative merit over traditional liberal accounts. In 
the next chapter I will attempt to highlight some aspects of Rawls’ view of 
political philosophy, and discuss the relationship between principled and modus 




5. Toleration between Respect and Fear 
Introduction 
In the preceding chapters I developed and defended a Rawlsian conception 
of toleration. A key element in such a conception is the “burdens of judgment”, 
features of the normal functioning of ordinary human reason that leads not to a 
convergence on a single comprehensive doctrine, but instead, reasonable 
pluralism. The burdens of judgment account for why disagreement is likely to 
persist even in the case of reasonable citizens exercising their reason sincerely and 
conscientiously. The next step involves making a connection between the burdens 
of judgment and the conclusion of toleration: citizens owe each other a moral duty 
of fairness, specified in terms of mutual respect and reciprocity. This is what 
makes the account of toleration distinctively liberal. I argued that such a Rawlsian 
conception of liberal toleration is suitable one, given the desiderata. I then tried to 
show what it means to accept such a conception of toleration in controversial 
cases like physician-assisted suicide, and provided a response against the 
objection that it is no different from traditional defenses of liberalism and 
toleration. Yet the following worry remains from our previous chapter: Is Shklar’s 
“liberalism of fear” (and for that matter, a Rawls’ political liberalism) more like a 
modus vivendi than a principled argument for toleration? Secondly, following 
Glaucon in Plato’s Republic, why would anyone, or any group that is in a position 
of power or majority be willing to tolerate the weaker party, especially if one 
believes that his moral convictions are not just reasonable but also true? Is it not 
too optimistic to assume that citizens are in great part reasonable? Does the 
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“liberalism of fear”, or even a principled conception of toleration have anything to 
say to citizens who refuse to tolerate others, when it would be right to do so?  
In this chapter, I want to argue that a conception of toleration that is 
Rawlsian in spirit can be sustained – that is to say, as far as possible, accepting as 
many lines of reasoning which support its conclusion of mutual toleration that 
exist, some of which are mutually incompatible; its ecumenism is a strength rather 
than a weakness. This implies that we accept toleration in a sense “between 
respect and fear”, on the one hand looking towards and being supported by a 
principled account that is based on broadly shared political values, but on the 
other, always being aware of the lessons of political history and the need to 
address basic realities of human existence. Considerations of self-interest ought 
not be denigrated as they can have persuasive force when shared principles are 
weak or non-existent, and thus can be an important first step. Yet to remain within 
a modus vivendi is less than ideal, and wherever possible we ought to work out 
more fully and affirm a conception of toleration that is based upon shared political 
values. Also, having an appreciation of what Rawls considers to be the methods 
and roles of political philosophy may shed some light on what it can achieve, and 
in concluding my paper, I hope to make some speculative remarks with regards to 
this.  
One suggestion for an answer to the first concern may look like this: the 
initial appeal of the liberalism of fear does indeed owe much to considerations of 
self-interest, and the systematic fear that an individual himself does not want to 
experience. But Shklar’s discussion does not simply remain at this level: the step 
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of applying a test which is acceptable to citizens of a broad range of 
comprehensive persuasions attempts to transform what resembles a modus vivendi 
into a principled conception of liberalism (and toleration). To repeat, beginning 
with fear is not necessarily to end with it. In comparison, for Rawls, to develop a 
coherent political conception based on publicly affirmed political values fulfills 
the same function: such a conception is a moral one, and moreover, can be 
affirmed from within a variety of comprehensive moral and religious doctrines.179 
A society whose public consciousness and identity is informed by such a 
conception would have moved quite far from the baseline of an armistice. To be 
sure, posing the question of whether such a society has already (or ever) been 
fully attained in actual political life may incline us to pessimism. But the fact that 
many such attempts have been, and continue to be made by a variety of citizens 
should give us some hope. 
Rawls’ understanding of political philosophy and the role of reconciliation 
A brief examination of how Rawls conceives of political philosophy can 
perhaps strengthen our response to some of the objections raised thus far. For 
Rawls, political philosophy does not have special access to fundamental truths or 
ideas of justice and the common good; rather, by study and reflection it may 
elaborate deeper and more instructive conceptions of basic political ideas that 
                                                          
179 To raise a possibility, Mill’s “harm principle” may fit such a criterion. Compare John Rawls, 
Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 340–56; Chin Liew Ten, 
“Religious Diversity, Toleration, and Interaction,” in Religious Diversity in Singapore, ed. Lai Ah 
Eng (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008), 566: “There are notions of harm, such as those 
inflicted by physical violence, disruptions of public order, and invasions of personal liberty, which 
all can acknowledge.” 
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help us clarify our judgments about public institutions.180 Political philosophy 
implicitly invokes the authority of human reason, and this is simply the shared 
powers of reasoned thought, judgment and inference as exercised by any fully 
normal person beyond the age of reason.181 This reason is exercised by all citizens 
when they address each other in a reasonable and conscientious manner on all 
questions, not just political ones.182 Thus striving for such credentials of human 
reason does not distinguish political philosophy from any other kind of ordinary 
reasoned discourse (and I believe we can infer, not just limited to philosophical 
discourse).183 
Political philosophy can play a role both in what is termed the 
“background culture” of a society, as well as its public political culture.184 In the 
background culture, political philosophy can play an educative role, offering 
certain ideal conceptions of person and political society before they come to 
politics: through examining the classic texts of the tradition of political thought, 
                                                          
180 John Rawls, Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy, ed. Samuel Freeman, First Edition 
(Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press, 2007), 1. 
181 Richard Rorty, “The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy,” in Objectivity, Relativism, and 
Truth: Volume 1: Philosophical Papers (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1990), 175: “Thomas Jefferson set the tone for American liberal politics when he said “it does me 
no injury for my neighbor to say that there are twenty Gods or no God.” His example helped make 
respectable the idea that politics can be separated from beliefs about matters of ultimate 
importance – that shared beliefs among citizens on such matters are not essential to a democratic 
society. Like many other figures of the Enlightenment, Jefferson assumed that a moral faculty 
common to the typical theist and the typical atheist suffices for civic virtue.” 
182 Rawls, Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy, 2. 
183 John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, ed. Erin Kelly, 2nd edition (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Belknap Press, 2001), 92: “All ways of reasoning – whether individual, associational, or 
political – must accept certain common elements: principles of inference and rules of evidence; 
they must incorporate the fundamental concepts of judgment, inference, and evidence, and include 
standards of correctness and criteria of truth. Otherwise they would not be ways of reasoning but 
something else: mere rhetoric or artifices of persuasion.” See also Joshua Cohen, “Truth and 
Public Reason,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 37, no. 1 (2009): 2–42. 
184 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 14. 
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political philosophy provides a source of essential political principles and ideals, 
and in a constitutional democracy, plays a role in strengthening the roots of 
democratic thought and attitudes. In the public political culture of society, Rawls 
distinguishes four roles that political philosophy can play. Two are especially 
important, and I limit myself to discussing them in greater detail here: they are 
respectively, orientation and reconciliation. 
According to Rawls, the role of orientation  
“…is one of reason and reflection. Political philosophy may contribute to 
how a people think of their political and social institutions as a whole, of 
themselves as citizens, and of their basic aims and purposes as a society 
with a history – a nation – as opposed to their aims and purposes as 
individuals, or members of families and associations.”185 
How then does political philosophy contribute to how individuals understand their 
collective identity as citizens? One possible way is in working out a coherent 
conception of political justice that can serve as part of a citizen’s self-
understanding. Rawls’ own political liberalism is an attempt at working out how 
the various concepts such as freedom, equality, reasonableness etc. relate to each 
other in a unified framework. It proposes a way for individual citizens to conceive 
of themselves qua citizens (as each having two moral powers developed to a 
sufficient degree, a sense of justice etc.), and in relation to society as a whole. 
                                                          
185 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 3: “The idea is that it belongs to reason and reflection (both 
theoretical and practical) to orient us in the (conceptual) space, say, of all possible ends, individual 
and associational, political and social.”  
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This self-understanding may already exist in nascent form implicit in actual social 
and political interactions, but making them explicit in a coherent account of 
political justice that is publicly available has potentially great value in many 
respects.186 In conceiving of political society as a “social union of social unions” 
with distinctive and independent norms and values, political philosophy can help 
us go beyond narrow individual interests and associations united on 
comprehensive conceptions of the good.187 In addition, Rawls’ own conception 
also tries to help us negotiate the relationship between our own comprehensive 
doctrines and the demands of political justice by showing that they are potentially 
compatible.188  
The next role is that of reconciliation, 
“…stressed by Hegel in his Philosophy of Right (1821)…political 
philosophy may try to calm our frustration and rage against our society 
and its history by showing us the way in which its institutions, when 
                                                          
186 See John Rawls, “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory,” in Collected Papers, ed. Samuel 
Freeman, Revised ed. edition (Harvard University Press, 2001), 322–27. 
187 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 1999), 456–64. Cf. Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 94: “…political liberalism does not view 
political society as an association. Quite the contrary, it insists on the distinction between a 
political society and an association. Associations within society can be communities united on 
shared final ends; indeed this is essential: were it not the case social life would lose its point.” 
188 Consider what Rawls calls “reasoning from conjecture” in Rawls, Political Liberalism, 462: 
“we reason from what we believe, or conjecture, may be other people’s basic doctrines, religious 
or philosophical, and seek to show them that, despite what they might think, they can still endorse 
a reasonable political conception of justice. We are not ourselves asserting that ground of 
toleration but offering it as one they could assert consistent with their comprehensive doctrines.” 
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properly understood, from a philosophical point of view, are rational, and 
developed over time as they did to attain their present, rational form.”189 
For instance, “the fact of profound and irreconcilable differences in citizens’ 
reasonable comprehensive religious and philosophical conceptions” is not always 
easy to accept.190 However, if we are suitably reconciled in this manner, “…we 
are to accept and affirm our social world positively, not merely be resigned to 
it.”191 Political philosophy achieves this reconciliation by “…showing us the 
reason and indeed the political good and benefits of it.”192 Once again, I believe 
this can be done in a way that avoids contentious metaphysical doctrines of say, a 
Hegelian philosophy of history.193 But then, how exactly is this to proceed? One 
interesting example that echoes Rousseau of Du Contrat Social194 is Rawls’ 
discussion on the “outer limits of our freedom”, in which he attempts to 
distinguish between public and non-public reason.195 Political society, is to be 
distinguished from private associations in part because the power of the 
government is so pervasive, and can only be evaded by leaving the state’s 
territory.196 Because the bonds of society and culture begin to shape our lives 
                                                          
189 Rawls, Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy, 10. See also Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 
3–4: “This fits one of Hegel’s well-known sayings: ‘When we look at the world rationally, the 
world looks rationally back.’” 
190 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 3. 
191 Ibid., 3–4. 
192 Ibid., 4. 
193 It is important to note that there must be limits to how reconciliation is to be understood, 
otherwise it may be unacceptable to those who hold certain comprehensive doctrines. Consider the 
Christian, who believes that he/she is ultimately not “at home in the world”; he/she is still awaiting 
a final reconciliation with the creator. Such a citizen can still understand the process of 
reconciliation in a suitably non-eschatological manner, consistent with his/her comprehensive 
doctrine, and perhaps even supported by it. 
194 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, “The Social Contract” and Other Later Political Writings, ed. Victor 
Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 41. 
195 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 92–94. 
196 Ibid., 93. 
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from the moment of birth, and we can only leave it with great difficulty, we 
cannot be said to freely accept the state’s authority in that sense. Nevertheless, we 
may come freely to accept the terms of political life as the outcome of reflective 
thought and judgment, mediated by a political conception of justice.197  
Political philosophy accomplishes this not by conclusive argument198, but 
in part by selecting relevant facts that fit into a “highly stylized history” in 
accordance with a normative theory of justice.199 Rawls candidly describes his 
own attempt at describing the historical origins of liberalism as “a philosopher’s 
schematic version of speculative history”200 that runs as follows: 
“…the Reformation and the religious wars of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries ending with, at first reluctant acceptance of the 
principle of toleration and liberty of conscience; the gradual taming of 
royal power by the rising middle classes and the establishment of 
constitutional regimes of limited monarchy; and the winning of the 
working classes to democracy and majority rule.”201 
                                                          
197 Consider Immanuel Kant, “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose,” in 
Kant: Political Writings, ed. H.S. Reiss (Cambridge University Press, 1991), 41–53; Georg 
Wilhelm Fredrich Hegel, Hegel: Elements of the Philosophy of Right, ed. Allen W. Wood, trans. 
H. B. Nisbet, Revised ed. edition (Cambridge University Press, 1991), 20–23. 
198 Cf. Rawls, Political Liberalism, 53. 
199 Jan-Werner Müller, “Rawls, Historian : Remarks on Political Liberalism’s ‘Historicism,’” 
Revue Internationale de Philosophie No 237, no. 3 (n.d.): 327–39: “we view the past (but not just 
the past) through the filter of an already existing construction of justice.” Cf. Rawls, Political 
Liberalism, 122: “Apart from a reasonable moral or political conception, facts are simply facts. 
What is wanted is a framework of reasoning within which to identify the facts that are relevant 
from the appropriate point of view and to determine their weight as reasons.” Also Rawls, 
Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy, 11n19. 
200 Rawls, Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy, 11n9. 
201 Ibid. Compare Rowan Williams, “Religion, Diversity and Tolerance,” in Faith in the Public 
Square (Bloomsbury Continuum, 2015), 76–78. 
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For some the mention of “selective history” immediately triggers an alarm, and 
Rawls himself warns against ideology in Marx’s sense, the corrupt defense of an 
unjust and unworthy status quo.202 Such a history is not meant to simply be a 
triumphalist vindication of the present age: Rawls clearly acknowledges that the 
reality today may still fall short of the ideal that is assumed in the speculative 
history (and theory of justice).203 A more accurate assessment I believe, is that it 
highlights the possibilities revealed through actual human history, some of which 
were unavailable in former ages.204 Thus a speculative history stands in between 
political reality and political theory: on the one hand, it identifies elements from 
actual history that can serve as a beginning for a theory of justice, and on the 
other, it serves as a kind of inspiration by providing an account of justice that we 
can aim towards.205 It is neither to offer an apology for a status quo that is 
manifestly unjust, nor an undying optimism that ignores the problems of social 
life. Rather, political philosophy allows us to arrive at a common reasonable 
agreement on the standards by which we are to judge the justice of political 
institutions, and on this basis to tell when things are going awry. Standing in 
relation to each other as citizens in public life is thus to express a kind of civic 
                                                          
202 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 4n4. 
203 Rawls, Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy, 11–12. Charges that Rawls is an 
apologist for American liberalism could not be further from the truth. Indeed, if some of his claims 
are taken seriously, they are a strong indictment of the injustice of the current American political 
system. 
204 Rawls, Political Liberalism, xxi–xxvi. 
205 I owe this point to Müller. 
100 
 
friendship that is grounded in shared political values, not merely to coexist 
uneasily in a kind of modus vivendi.206 
The way in which we conceive of political philosophy potentially has very 
deep implications for how we assess the attractiveness and success of any attempt 
at a theory of justice, not only liberal theories. What becomes clear from the 
above discussion is that political philosophy as conceived by Rawls, at least on 
his own terms, is to be judged as an entire theory and not simply to be 
undermined by disagreeing with supposedly foundational assumptions. If we 
agree with Rawls, judging the worthiness and value of a particular political 
philosophy is a far more complex matter. We see this complexity in what Rawls 
takes to be two important roles of political philosophy, namely, orientation and 
reconciliation. If a modus vivendi is characterized exclusively or primarily by 
considerations of self-interest, then Rawls’ political liberalism is not a mere 
modus vivendi. Thus, to reduce Rawls’ political liberalism to a mere modus 
vivendi account of justice is to pay insufficient attention to these aspects of his 
project. Of course, one can respond by arguing that political philosophy 
ultimately fails to fulfill these roles, or that an alternative conception of political 
philosophy (hopefully, not mere rhetoric or deception) proves to be superior. But I 
                                                          
206 Rawls acknowledges that reconciliation by way of political liberalism has its limits. See Rawls, 
Political Liberalism, lviii: “Political liberalism mitigates but cannot eliminate the first kind of 
conflict, since comprehensive doctrines are, politically speaking, unreconcilable and remain 
inconsistent with one other. However, the principles of justice of a reasonably just constitutional 
regime can reconcile us to the second kind of conflict. For once we accept principles of justice, or 
recognize them as at least reasonable (even though not as the most reasonable), and know that our 
political and social institutions conform to them, the second kind of conflict (i.e. from different 




believe, if we examine the more programmatic aspects of Rawls’ philosophy, 
some more obvious objections can be easily answered, as we have shown.  
Respect and Fear  
“…toleration and its awkward practices are likely to remain both 
necessary and in some degree possible. If so, it will be all the clearer…that 
the practice of toleration has to be sustained not so much by a pure 
principle resting on a value of autonomy as by a wider and more mixed 
range of resources.”207 
I now want to consider the relationship between modus vivendi arguments (which 
are significant and important) and principled arguments for toleration like Rawls’. 
I want to propose a strategy to navigate between the two kinds of argument for 
toleration. Such a strategy is hardly novel, and I take it to be consistent with the 
spirit of Rawls’ political liberalism. Roughly stated, we need not settle on one 
single argument which grounds political toleration; instead we can accept a family 
of such arguments, so long as they support the desired conclusion of toleration. 
Whether it be a principled argument in the form of political liberalism understood 
in terms of mutual respect, or pragmatic considerations appealing to self-interest, 
it seems to be a prima facie possibility that the two kinds of arguments can be 
made in a mutually consistent manner, whether in a single society or a single 
person. As previously discussed in chapter 1, each broad category of argument 
has its weaknesses and strengths: in light of the starting point of reasonable 
                                                          
207 Bernard Williams, “Toleration: An Impossible Virtue?,” in Toleration: An Elusive Virtue, ed. 
David Heyd (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 26–27. 
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pluralism, principled arguments for toleration have to be acceptable to all in order 
for them to be effective, and thus many conceptions which only appeal to 
particular principles that do not have broad appeal are unsuitable. In comparison, 
pragmatic arguments seem to have broader appeal, if only they speak to 
something more basic, to fear and self-interest. However, the strength of such 
arguments, and the stability of toleration that it procures is contingent upon the 
balance of power and interests between different groups and individuals in 
society, and such conditions are vulnerable to change, sometimes quickly and 
imperceptibly. Yet very often a long and lasting peace begins with an armistice, 
and thus we ought not underestimate the role that pragmatic considerations play in 
the initial stages of society before political values and an idea of citizenship can 
take hold. Even if we live in a society where there is already broad and deep 
public consensus on political values and the duties and obligations of citizenship, 
we do well to bear in mind the kinds of considerations which predominate in a 
modus vivendi type situations, considerations that can reassert themselves should 
the social compact erode significantly. 
There are then at least two ways in which pragmatic arguments can 
complement principled ones: firstly, given that the two kinds of argument are 
ultimately not mutually exclusive, they can both support the same conclusion of 
toleration through different lines of argument. The two kinds of argument appeal 
to different starting points that can (and do in reality) exist together: respectively a 
concern with, and desire to secure the basic conditions of life for oneself, and also 
the ability and willingness to cooperate socially on the basis of shared political 
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values. Secondly, as highlighted by Rawls, pragmatic arguments, just like 
justifications from within comprehensive doctrines can in fact lead to more 
enduring and stable types of principled toleration, once conditions become 
favorable for such a movement.208 One example serves to drive this home. 
Consider the initial state of enmity between the Catholics and Protestants in the 
religious wars of the 16th century, cited by Rawls as the paradigmatic example of 
a modus vivendi. In this case, both parties held that it was the duty of the ruler to 
uphold the true religion and repress the spread of heresy.209 As long as their 
relative power vis-a-vis each other remained roughly equal, the calculus of party 
interests led them to mutually tolerate each other. However, should either party 
fully gain its way, it would impose its own comprehensive doctrine as the sole 
admissible faith.210 Such a state of affairs is not ideal, for reasons previously 
discussed. Despite this, in a society characterized by such a modus vivendi, the 
toleration secured211 can still play an important role in quieting divisiveness and 
encouraging social stability, even if it is only a veneer. As Rawls stresses, even if 
religious toleration begins out of self-interest, a reasonably successful political 
arrangement that endures will gradually win the allegiance of citizens, moving 
beyond concerns of mere self-interest.212 Political philosophy can play a crucial 
role in bringing this about. 
                                                          
208 Rawls, Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy, 8. 
209 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 148. 
210 Ibid., 459. 
211 I do not discuss public reason in depth, but it is obvious how a Rawlsian conception of 
toleration can play a similar role. 
212 Rawls, Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy, 8; See also John Rawls, The Law of 




Mutual toleration thus represents a kind of minimum in our idea of a just 
and stable society: a society in which the relationships between people and groups 
are characterized only (or chiefly) by mutual toleration is not ideal, but one could 
surely do a lot worse. In the same way, pragmatic arguments for toleration are our 
arguments of last appeal: if arguments of principle are exhausted or in the final 
analysis unpersuasive, the more “visceral” considerations of the possibility of 
mutual bloodshed need to be driven home. That they secure the conclusion of 
mutual toleration from instrumental considerations ought not detract from their 
political, historical and psychological importance. In even more stark terms, what 
is instrumentally secured is collectively speaking, life and the conditions of 
existence itself. Without the latter, one could not speak about anything else, let 
alone the good life. 
Let us now recall that one of the original motivations to search for a 
principled conception of toleration is that modus vivendi type justifications are 
insufficiently stable. One such objection centers on the basis for such toleration: if 
the balance of power or calculus of perceived costs to benefits of coercive 
interference changes significantly, then it may no longer make sense for the now 
more powerful group to tolerate the weaker one. Yet the argument for toleration is 
addressed primarily to the party who is to tolerate. In the case of Shklar’s 
liberalism of fear, it is addressed to the powerful. Why then, to reprise Glaucon’s 
question, should the powerful have to honor such terms?  
It should not surprise us that I have little more to say to this group, and my 
response may come as a disappointment. But even the more powerful group is 
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subject to the same background condition, namely, the fact of reasonable 
pluralism. If this is so, they ought to be able to appreciate the advantages of a 
liberal conception of toleration: given our circumstances, this may be our best 
shot at a peaceful coexistence. Similarly, Hobbesians who reject the 
reasonableness of citizens are still primarily concerned about security. From their 
concern for security, Hobbesians have a strong reason to support the practice of 
toleration. In brief, our cause is far from lost. 
Conclusion 
Returning to Rousseau’s statement, does “theological intolerance” 
necessarily lead to “civil intolerance”? Is it in fact impossible to “live in peace” 
with those who one believes to be “damned”?  A closer inspection of Rousseau’s 
proposed solution in Du Contrat Social shows that Rousseau may in fact agree 
with the modern liberal solution. The notion of a civil religion may not please 
Atheists nor Christians: it is far too much for the atheist, and far too austere for 
the Christian. However, leaving aside its positive dogmas213, the rationale of why 
there must be a civil religion comes very close to the Rawlsian concern for 
preserving the necessary conditions social and political life. The purely “civil 
profession of faith”, Rousseau writes, are: 
 “…not precisely…dogmas of Religion but…sentiments of sociability, 
without which it is impossible to be either a good citizen or a loyal 
subject…the sovereign may banish from the State anyone who does not 
                                                          
213 Rousseau, Rousseau, 150–51. 
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believe them…not as impious but as unsociable, as incapable of sincerely 
loving the laws, justice, and if need be of sacrificing his life to his 
duty.”214 
Thus, even though Rousseau proposes to curtail the expression of certain religious 
opinions, it is noteworthy that he limits the negative dogmas of his proposed civil 
religion to a single one, intolerance. All things considered, it is not difficult to 
believe that he can be persuaded to accept a liberal conception of toleration. 
The idealizing assumptions of political philosophy are sometimes 
criticized as being unrealistic. It would indeed be naïve to assume that deep seated 
racial, religious, and cultural tensions will ever be fully resolved, at the very least 
not in the near future. As such, we must never discount the real possibility that 
certain kinds of irrational beliefs and fears may lead to intolerant behavior. Here 
we have perhaps arrived at not just the limits of toleration or liberalism, but the 
limits of philosophy and rational discourse. But before we reach this point, there 
is much to be said and argued. Ultimately, the horizon of political philosophy is 
not simply about the just, but the good life. If indeed we are able to pursue and 
actualize our cherished life goals while on the one hand living in peace and 
mutual respect, and on the other, without giving up our substantive moral 
convictions, we would have collectively achieved a great good. 
                                                          
214 Ibid., 150. Also: “…the dogmas of this religion are of concern to the State or to its members 
insofar as the dogmas bear on morality, and on the duties which anyone who professes it is 
bound to fulfill toward others. Beyond this everyone may hold whatever opinions he 
pleases…For since the sovereign has no competence in the other world, whatever the subjects’ 
fate may be in the life to come is none of its business, provided they are good citizens in this 
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